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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, COUNSEL. 
3 THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR THE RULING IN THE INSTANT 
4 MATTER, SWEENEY LAND COMPANY VS. GILBERT AND MAUD KIMBALL, 
5 ETC., CASE NO. 6211. LET ME FIRST SAY THAT THIS HAS BEEN 
6 A DIFFICULT CASE BECAUSE OF THE (CONFLICTING NATURE OF THE 
7 I ISSUES INVOLVED, AND I WANT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO 
ALL COUNSEL FOR WHAT I DEEM TO HAVE BEEN A VERY PROFESSIONAL 
COMPETENT PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE. 
I HAVE NOW REVIEWED THE FILE, THE EXHIBITS, 
u I HEARD THE TESTIMONY, AND I AM PREPARED TO RULE 
12 IN THIS CASE, THE PLAINTIFF FILED SUIT AUGUST 
13 20TH OF 1980 SEEKING TO QUIET TITLE IN ITSELF FOR PROPERTY 
14 ACQUIRED FROM UNITED PARK MINES COMPANY THROUGH JOHN J. 
15 I SWEENEY ON FEBRUARY THE 15TH OF 1980, SPECIFICALLY CHALLENG-
16 | ING THE CLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS FLETCHER TO THE SO-CALLED 
17 I 30-FOOT STRIP OF DISPUTED PROPERTY, AND THE CLAIMS OF 
8 
9 
10 
18 
19 
20 
23 
24 
25 
DEFENDANTS KIMBALL TO THE HERCIHISER PARCEL AND THE 30-FOOT 
STRIP; DEFENDANTS FLETCHER AND PLAINTIFF BASICALLY HAVE 
RESOLVED THEIR DISAGREEMENT BY INTERIM CONVEYANCES PURSUANT 
TO STIPULATION. 
21 
22 I CONSEQUENTLY, DEFENDANTS FLETCHER MAKE NO SUB 
STANTIVE CLAIM TO THE HERCIHISER PARCEL. DEFENDANTS 
FLETCHER CLAIM INTEREST IN THE DISPUTED 30-FOOT STRIP BY 
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF SAID PARCEL BY OPEN NOTORIOUS HOSTILE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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USE OF THE SAME CONTRARY TO THE INTEREST OF THE DEFENDANTS 
KIMBALL, AND THE PLAINTIFF, FOR IN EXCESS OF THE REQUISITE 
SEVEN YEARS REQUIRED AND/OR ALTERNATIVELY BY PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENT AGAINST ALL OTHER PARTIES ON ESSENTIALLY THE SAME GROUNDS 
FOR A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF 20 YEARS. DEFENDANTS FLETCHER 
LIKEWISE CLAIM AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST AS CO-TENANTS 
IN WHAT I SHOULD CALL THE PRINCIPAL KIMBALL PARCEL BY DEED 
FROM ELIZABETH KIMBALL OF MAY THE 19TH, 1981, EXHIBIT 17, 
SHE HAVING ACQUIRED THAT INTEREST IN THE SAME FROM HER 
LATE HUSBAND, ROBERT KIMBALL. 
DEFENDANTS KIMBALL CLAIM ON THE CONTRARY THAT THE 
ORIGINAL CO-TENANCY BETWEEN ROBERT AND GILBERT KIMBALL WAS 
TERMINATED EITHER BY DISCLAIMER AND/OR ADVERSE POSSESSION 
AGAINST. ROBERT KIMBALL. THEY LIKEWISE CLAIM TITLE TO THE 
HERCIHISER PROPERTY AND 30-FOOT STRIP BY SURVEY AND RESIST 
THE CLAIM OF FLETCHER TO THE 30-FOOT STRIP BY CLAIMING 
PERMISSIVE USE BY FLETCHERS AND/OR THEIR PREDECESSORS IN 
INTEREST, THE WORKMANS. 
TITLE 78-12-7 ET SEQ. THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
STATES THE STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR CERTAIN PRESUMPTIONS THAT 
ARISE IN ADVERSE POSSESSION CASES, SPECIFICALLY IF THE 
PROPERTY IS HELD BY THE PARTY CLAIMING SUCH AN INTEREST AS 
INTERPRETED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, AND SAID USE IS 
CONTINUOUS, OPEN AND NOTORIOUS TO THE RECORT ' TLE OWNER'S 
INTEREST FOR AT LEAST SEVEN YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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OF THE SUIT, THE ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE ADVERSE USE PARTY 
HAS LEGAL TITLE. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CLAIMS ARE ESSEN-
TIALLY THE SAME AS ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIMS EXCEPT THAT 
THE PRESUMPTION ARISES IN FAVOR OF THE USER AFTER AT LEAST 
20 YEARS ADVERSE USE. ZOLLINGER V. FRANK, 172 P.2D 714, 
1946 CASE, AND THE ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL CASE IN UTAH, 
HARKNESS V. WOODMANSEE, 7 UTAH 227, THP EVIDENCE Itl I HI . 
CASE HAS ESTABLISHED TO MY SATISFACTION BY A PREPONDERANCE 
THAT THE FLETCHERS HAVE USED ADVERSELY, OPENLY AND NOTORI-
OUSLY THE DISPUTED 30-FOOT STRIP PARCEL AS AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS KIMBALL SUFFICIENT TO RAISE THE REQUISITE PRE-
SUMPTION THEIR CLAIM IS A MATTER OF RIGHT EITHER UNDER THE 
THEORY OF ADVERSE POSSESSION OR PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. IN 
MY JUDGMENT DEFENDANTS KIMBALL HAVE FAILED, IN THIS COURT'S 
VIEW, TO REBUT SAID PRESUMPTION BY FAILING TO CARRY THEIR 
BURDEN TO ESTABLISH THAT SAID ADVERSE USE WAS PURELY PER-
MISSIVE. 
IT IS THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THE DEFENDANTS' 
KIMBALLiRELIANCE ON THE DEEDS BETWEEN THEMSELVES OF 1977 ON 
THE BASIS OF THE 1976 JONES SURVEY IS MISPLACED. MR. JONES 
HIMSELF TESTIFII - IS SURVEY WAS BASED IN LARGE PART 
ON GILBERT KIMBALL'S INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT WERE THE 
BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY, WHICH I FIND TO BE IN ERROR. 
ACCORDINGLY, TITLE IS QUIETED UN I III 30-FOOT STRIP IN THE 
DEFENDANTS FLETCHER. I FIND FOR SIMILAR REASONS THAT NO 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CLAIM TO THE HERCIHISER PARCEL IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE 
PLAINTIFF. TITLE TO THAT PARCEL IS QUIETED IN THE PLAINTIFF 
AS TO THE PRINCIPAL KIMBALL PARCEL, IT IS THE LAW 
IN UTAH THAT CO-TENANTS IN REALITY STAND IN A UNIQUE RE-
LATIONSHIP OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST BY REASON OF THEIR 
COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS. THIS RELATIONSHIP MAKES IT PARTICU-
LARLY DIFFICULT FOR A PARTY TO CLAIM ADVERSE POSSESSION 
AGAINST HIS CO-TENANT. THE CO-TENANT'S INTEREST MUST BE 
DISAVOWED BY THE ACTS OF THE MOST OPEN AND NOTORIOUS 
CHARACTER^ WHICH SHOW CLEARLY TO THE WORLD THE CLAIMANT'S 
INTENTION TO EXCLUDE THE RIGHTS OF THE CO-TENANTS. THERE 
IS A HIGHER STRICTER STANDARD OF NOTICE TO HIS CO-TENANT 
COMMENSURATE WITH HIS POSITION ' OF TRUST.. PAYMENT OF 
TAXES BY ONE CO-TENANT INURES TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL, OR 
BOTH IN THIS CASE, CO-TENANTS, CREATING A RIGHT OF REIMBURSE 
MENT ONLY. MCCREADY V. FREDERICKSEN, hi UTAH 388, AND 
SEVERAL CASES SINCE AND UP TO AND INCLUDING THE CASE OF 
OLWELL V. CLARK, 658 P.2D 585, 1982. THE EVIDENCE, IN MY 
JUDGMENT, HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE CO-TENANCY 
BETWEEN ROBERT AND GILBERT KIMBALL WAS TERMINATED. 
ACCORDINGLY, DEFENDANTS FLETCHER CLAIMING THROUGH ELIZABETH 
KIMBALL DEED, EXHIBIT 17, ARE DECLARED TO BE CO-TENANTS WITH 
MAUD KIMBALL IN THE PRINCIPAL KIMBALL PARCEL. 
IT IS FURTHER DETERMINED THAT SAID PARCEL SHOULD 
BE AND THEREFORE IS PARTITIONED. THE NORTHERN ONE-HALF 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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TO THE DEFENDANTS FLETCHER FREE; AND:CLEAR: OF ANY " 
CLAIM OF THE DEFENDANTS KIMBALL, AND THE SOUTHERN ONE-HALF 
TO THE DEFENDANTS KIMBALL FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY CLAIM OF 
THE DEFENDANTS FLETCHER. DEFENDANT KIMBALL IS TO BE 
REIMBURSED FOR THE ONE-HALF OF THE TAXES PAID BY SHE AND 
HER HUSBAND AS TENDERED TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT. EACH 
PARTY IN THIS CASE IS TO BEAR THEIR OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AS WELL AS COSTS. 
MR. KINGHORN, WILL YOU PREPARE THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE, PURSUANT TO RULE /+? 
MR. KINGHORN: YES, YOUR HONOR, I WILL. 
THE COURT: ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS, GENTLEMEN? 
VERY WELL. COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
MR. FELTON: THANK YOU. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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GERALD H. KINGHORN 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorney for Melvin and Peggy Fletcher 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8644 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL 
et al., 
Defendants. 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL, 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY 
FLETCHER, et al., 
Counter-Crossclaintants. 
On the 5th day of September, 1985, at 9:00 a.m. the issues 
raised in the pleadings between the parties came on regularly for 
non-jury trial before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, 
at the Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah. 
The Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel, 
Edward S. Sweeney and Paul D. Veasy of Behle, Haslam and Hatch, 
the defendant, counterclaimant and crossclairaant Maud Kimball was 
present in person and by counsel, Robert M. Felton. Defendants, 
counterclaimants and crossclaimants, Melvin and Peggy Fletcher 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 6211 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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were present in person and were represented by Gerald H. Kinghorn 
of Kapaloski, Kinghorn & Peters. 
Mr. Felton moved the Court for an order excluding witnesses 
from the Courtroom until called to testify. The motion was 
granted and the Court asked that each witness proposed by the 
parties, except the parties themselves, be sworn. The Court then 
admonished the witnesses to not discuss their testimony or the 
testimony of others except with counsel. The proposed witnesses 
were then excluded from the Courtroom. 
Counsel for each party made a short opening statement. After 
the conclusion of the opening statements of counsel, Mr. Felton 
moved the Court for an order granting a judgment of quiet title 
to Maud Kimball for a portion of the property at issue generally 
described as the "Hershiser* parcel. After hearing the arguments 
of counsel, the Court denied the motion with leave to reconsider 
after hearing the evidence. 
The parties presented a written stipulation to the Court 
signed by counsel fpr each party to permit the admission as 
evidence of the exhibits named in the stipulation, reserving the 
claims of the parties as to the relevance and/or materiality of 
the exhibits. The stipulation is the result of pretrial confer-
ences between counsel for the parties where the stipulated 
exhibits were disclosed, reviewed, investigated and corrected 
where appropriate, to enable the parties to stipulate to the 
admission of the exhibits without the necessity of individual 
witness or document foundation for each exhibit. It is the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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V -
understanding of the parties on the record that the plaintiffs 
exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 5 are admitted for illustrative purposes 
only* The Court approved the stipulation of the parties and 
received the exhibits in evidence. 
The Plaintiff called and examined the following witnesses: 
Randy Sorensen, Robert B. Jones, Melvin H. Fletcher and Edward 
S. Sweeney. 
The Defendant Kimball then called and examined the following 
witnesses: Maud Kimball, Gary Kimball, Robert Ruggeri, Melvin 
Fletcher; the deposition of Gilbert Kimball was considered as 
evidence of the testimony of Gilbert Kimball. The depositions of 
Maud Kimball and Melvin Fletcher were published. 
The Defendants Fletcher then called and examined the follow-
ing witnesses: Les Roach and Elizabeth W. Kimball. 
Following the testimony of the witnesses on behalf of the 
Defendants Fletcher, Defendant Kimball recalled Maud Kimball as a 
rebuttal witness. 
Each party rested and a closing statement was made by 
counsel for each of the parties. At the conclusion of the 
closing statements of counsel, the Court recessed the trial at 
5:30 p.m. on September 5th to be reconvened at 9:00 a.m. on 
September 6, 1985 for further proceedings. On September 6 at 
9:00 a.m. trial was reconvened and the Court announced its 
decision in general terms and directed counsel for the Defendants 
Fletcher to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree of Quiet Title based on the evidence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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c u 
Based upon the testimony in open Court, the documents , 
surveys and affidavits entered into evidence, the candor and lack 
of candorf demeanor of the witnesses and parties and the equities 
in favor of or against each party apparent from the facts and 
circumstances established by the evidence, the Court makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property which is the subject of the claims of 
the parties is located in Block 53 of Snyders Addition to Park 
City as recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Summit 
County, Utah. 
2. Block 53 of Snyders Addition to Park City as shown by 
the records of the Summit County Recorder was platted as a block 
of land without platting or dedication of interior streets or 
further subdivision into lots. 
3. The Plaintiff and the Defendants Fletcher signed and 
filed a stipulation dated May 31, 1984. Sweeney Land Company and 
Melvin Fletcher and
 #Peggy Fletcher have performed the execution 
and delivery of the deeds described in the stipulation. 
4. Based on the pleadings herein, the parties claim 
unencumbered fee simple title to certain parcels of land general-
ly described as follows: 
Sweeney Land Co. claims title to a parcel of land approxi-
mately 30 feet in width extending from the east street line of 
Park Avenue in Park City as the westerly boundary, thence in a 
northeasterly direction thirty feet wide for approximately 164 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
received a deed from Elizabeth W. Kimball in 1983, which de-
scribed the same land as claimed by Maud Kimball. 
5* For at least one hundred years prior to the filing of 
the complaint herein, properties were generally conveyed in the 
area of the subject properties without accurate surveyed or 
dimension specific legal descriptions and under general state-
ments as to the location and dimensions of the subject prop-
erties. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable that the Court 
interpret the legal descriptions contained in the various instru-
ments upon which the parties claims are based in a manner consis-
tent with the physical location of buildings and objects in 
relation to each other, roads, improvements, dimensions described 
in the instruments and the actual possession of the properties by 
the parties and their predecessors in interest. 
7. The 30 foot strip claimed by the Plaintiff Sweeney was 
conveyed to the Sweeney's predecessor, the United Park City Mines 
Co., in 1953 by the Silver King Coalition Mines Company and Park 
Utah Consolidated Mir^ es Company by a deed which described the 
property as a 30 foot strip of land which began at the easterly 
side of Park Avenue and extended in a northerly direction for an 
indefinite distance to a point generally stated as a right-of-way 
granted under a specific deed dated November 13, 1883. The 
November 13, 1883 deed described in the conveyance to United Park 
City Mines Co. is not of record and there is no evidence of the 
terms or specific location of the right of way described in the 
missing deed. In 1953 when the deed to United Park Mines was Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
executed and delivered, the scalehouse and warehouse described in 
the legal description of the 30 foot strip were not in existence 
and therefore the northeasterly boundary of the 30 foot strip 
could not be identified. 
8. In 1940 Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert Kimball purchased 
from Summit County certain interests in land in the area of the 
Hershiser-Kimball parcel* The area had been purchased in 1928 by 
Robert W. Kimball, the father of Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert 
Kimball. Robert W. Kimball conveyed the property to Robert T, 
Kimball. Robert and Gilbert thereafter deeded the property in a 
mortgage-deed transaction as security for a loan. Taxes on the 
property were not paid and the property ultimately was purchased 
by Summit County for taxes. In 1940 Robert T. Kimball and 
Gilbert Kimball purchased the Hershiser-Kimball parcel from 
Summit County under a general legal description which did not 
completely and accurately describe the dimensions of the area 
Summit County intended to convey and the Kimballs intended to 
purchase. , 
Robert T. Kimball and Gilbert Kimball were brothers and 
business partners in the Kimball service station and garage. In 
1976, the Defendant Kimball commissioned a survey by Robert Jones 
of the property owned pursuant to the deed from Summit County 
executed and delivered in 1940 to Gilbert Kimball and Robert T. 
Kimball. The 1976 Jones survey accurately depicts the property 
intended to be conveyed to the Kimball brothers.in 1940 by Summit 
County. 
- 7 -
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9. The plaintiff received a quitclaim deed from United 
Park City Mines . in 1980 containing a land description which 
partially overlaps the property claimed by the Defendants 
Fletcher and Kimball; the Plaintiffs were on notice by virtue of 
the recordation of the deed by the Defendant Kimball of the 
overlap and the actual occupation and historic use of the area by 
Fletcher that title to the 30 foot strip was disputed. The 
Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest used aind occupied no 
more than the north 15 feet of the 30 foot stripf for a distance 
of 99 feet extending from the easterly right of way line of Park 
Avenue. 
10. Portions of the property claimed by Sweeney Land Co. 
and Kimball have been used and occupied by the Defendants 
Fletcher for a period in excess of 20 years openly and notorious-
ly. The use of the Hershiser-Kimball property by the Defendants 
Fletcher and the Fletchers predecessor in interest was not under 
any agreement or permission from any person or entity. There is 
no credible evidence, that the Fletchers use was not adverse to 
Kimballs and all others and therefore the use by Fletchers was 
and is adverse to the Kimballs. The area used and occupied 
openly, notoriously, adversely, and exclusively by the Defendants 
Fletcher is generally described as that area lying North of a 
line beginning at the Southeast corner of the land conveyed to 
Melvin H. Fletcher by his predecessor in interest and proceeding 
therefrom at a bearing of North 61° 10' East across the Kimball 
property to the gravel road depicted on the exhibits a distance 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(>w +* 
of approximately 71 ft. with the exception of a small stucco 
building located on the property which has been used by the 
Defendant Kimball since approximately 1940. No portion of the 
property described by the Kimball counterclaim has been occupied 
by the Kimballs with the exception of the stucco building in-
dicated on the Exhibits within the last forty years. 
The Defendants Fletcher occupied the area of the 30 foot 
strip claimed by the Defendants Kimball for a period in excess of 
20 years and used the area for commercially valuable purposes 
including ingress and egress to their property, for parking of 
vehicles, for garage purposes and for the storage of household 
materials, garden utensils, hunting equipment and other miscella-
neous, personal property. 
11. The Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest paid 
property taxes for an area which was indefinite and therefore the 
Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof that the 
Plaintiff paid property taxes on the entire 30 foot strip as 
claimed in the complaint. The payment of property taxes by the 
Plaintiff was consistent with the claims of the other parties and 
the legal description in the deed tor United Park City Mines in 
1953. 
12. The Kimballs paid property taxes from 1977 to the 
present on the entire parcel described in the survey of property 
by Robert B. Jones. 
13. Based on the testimony of Maud Kimball and the rele-
vant deed language Gilbert J. Kimball and Maud Kimball intended 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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V 
.5 
to create a joint tenancy interest between themselves by the 
execution and recordation of the deeds. Gilbert Kimball died 
prior to the trial of the matter and his joint tenant Maud 
Kimball survived him. 
14. There is no evidence that Gilbert J. Kimball, Maud 
Kimball or any party on their behalf ever provided notice of any 
kind to Robert W. Kimball or his successors to the effect that 
Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball intended to adversely possess 
the Kimball parcel as against Robert W. Kimball; there is no 
instrument or other evidence of the conveyance of the co-tenant 
interest of Robert W. Kimball to Gilbert Kimball or Maud Kimball 
or conveyance of the interest of Robert W. Kimball to any party 
other than by operation of law to Robert's heir, Elizabeth 
Wilkins Kimball. In 1976, (the date of death of Robert W. 
Kimball) Robert Kimball had not received notice of any act of 
adverse possession or executed any instrument to convey the 
Kimball parcel; Robert Kimball possessed an undivided 50% 
interest in the Her.shiser-Kimball parcel as more correctly 
described in the Robert B. Jones survey which is of record. 
15. Since 1942 Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball have paid 
the property taxes on the Hershiser-Kimball parcel including the 
taxes due November 30, 1983 in the total amount of $4,641.66. 
The record shows that on or about February 15, 1984, the 
Fletchers tendered the sum of $2,320.83 to the Defendant Kimball 
by check to the Clerk of the Court where the funds tendered are 
on deposit. The Defendants Fletcher are indebted to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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L, 
Defendant Kimball for one half of the amount of all property 
taxes paid by the Defendant Kimball which is the sum of $2,320.83 
not including taxes for the years 1984 and 1985. The Defendants 
Fletcher owe an amount equal to one half of the property taxes 
for 1984 and 1985 to Maud Kimball. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact the Court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The claim of each party must be sustainable on its own 
merits. Each claim should be evaluated based on a root of title 
or title by adverse possession where appropriate. The terms of 
the stipulation are reasonable and the stipulation should be 
approved and recognized by the Court and where otherwise appro-
priate made a part of the Decree of Quiet Title herein. 
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of.quiet title as 
its sole property to a strip of land north of the centerline of 
the 30 foot strip for a distance of 99.03 feet from the east 
right-of-way line*of P^rk Avenue as platted in the plat of 
Snyders Addition to Park City. The Plaintiff may be entitled to 
a decree quieting title in the Plaintiff to a 50% undivided 
« 
interest with Maud Kimball in the Hershiser parcel deeded to the 
Plaintiff by Defendants Fletcher together with a 50% undivided 
interest in the 15 feet North of the centerline of the 30 foot 
strip deeded to the Plaintiff by the Defendants Fletcher. 
Because the pleadings of the Plaintiffs do not state a claim for 
quiet title as a co-tenant with Maud Kimball or for partition of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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•w W 
the co-tenant interests the decree herein should not define an 
interest other than the interest of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder. 
3* The Defendants Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher are 
the successors-in-interest to the co-tenant interest of Robert W. 
Kimball as conveyed to them by his heir Elizabeth W. Kimball. It 
is reasonable that the interests of the co-tenants be partitioned 
in a manner consistent with the reasonable use of the property by 
each co-tenant and in a manner which will preserve the economic 
value for each party in a roughly equal manner. The decree of 
quiet title should partition the Hershiser-Kimball parcel to 
quiet title in Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher to the portion 
of the Hershiser-Kimball parcel described as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 23°38t West 
85*97 feet and North 33°26f West 46.70 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Block 7, Amended 
plat of Park City in Section 16 Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and South 61o10' West, 73.16 feet 
and North 28° 50" West 55.7 feet to the true 
point of beginning; 
Thence'along the following courses and 
distances: North 28°50f West along the East 
boundary of the land conveyed to Melvin 
Fletcher by Mary Workman a. distance of 60.6 
feet, thence North 61*10' East 61.93 feet, 
thence South 43p 13f East 15 feet, thence 
South 33°25f East 47.6 feet more or less, 
thence South 61o10f West 70 feet more or less 
to the true point of beginning. 
4. The area of the Hershiser-Kimball parcel which is South 
of the Fletcher partition parcel described above should be 
partitioned to Maud Kimball as her sole and separate property. 
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Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball were joint tenants in the 50% 
undivided interest purchased by Gilbert in 1940 and therefore 
upon Gilbert's death any interest of Gilbert terminated and Maud 
became the sole owner of the 50% undivided interest in the 
Hershiser-Kimball parcel. A decree of quiet title should issue 
to Maud Kimball as follows: 
Beginning at a point North 23° 38f West 
85.97 feet and North 33° 261 West 46.7 feet 
from the Southeast corner of Block 7, amended 
plat of Park City, Utah in Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, thence South 61° 10f West 
73.16 feet, thence North 28° 50f West 55.7 
feet, thence North 61° 10' East, 70 feet more 
or less, thence South 33° 25f East, 58 feet 
more or less to the point of beginning. 
Maud Kimball should also be decreed a 50% undivided interest 
as a co-tenant with Sweeney Land Company as the owner of a 50% 
undivided interest in the Hershiser parcel as described in the 
exhibits and to the balance of the land north of the extended 
center line of the 30 foot strip immediately adjacent to the 
parcel of land quieted to Melvin Fletcher and Peggy Fletcher 
above. 
5. It is reasonable that each party bear its own attorneys 
fees and costs and therefore no award of attorneys fees or costs 
should be made to any party against the other. 
DATED this day of October, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
J. Dennis Frederick 
District Judge 
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GERALD H. KINGHORN 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Attorney for Melvin and Peggy Fletcher 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8644 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SWEENEY 
VS. 
GILBERT 
et al., 
GILBERT 
Crc 
vs. 
LAND COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
and MAUD KIMBALL ) 
Defendants. ) 
and MAUD KIMBALL, ) 
»ssclaim Plaintiffs, ) 
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY ) 
FLETCHER ,, et al., ) 
Counter-Crossclaimants. ) 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND TO ALTER OR AMEND 
THE JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 6211 
The motion of the Defendant Kimball and the Plaintiff for a 
new trial or in the alternative to alter or amend the judgment 
came on regularly for hearing on December 2, 1985 at 10:00 a.m. 
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge at the District 
Courtroom, Summit County Courthouse, Coalville, Utah. Counsel 
for the Defendant Kimball, Robert Felton, Counsel for the Plain-
tiff Sweeney Land Company, Paul Veasy and Counsel for Melvin and 
Peggy Fletcher, Gerald H. Kinghorn were present. 
C V U I O I T KX/\X " 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court heard the arguments for and in opposition to the 
motions, and upon being fully advised it is hereby ordered that 
each motion be and the same hereby are denied, 
DATED this day of January, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
J. Dennis Frederick 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOP NEW TRIAL AND TO ALTER OR 
AMEND THE JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following 
on this -2 day of January, 1986. 
Robert Felton 
5 Triad Center, Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Paul Veasy 
50 West Broadway 
4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Robert Felton, 1056 
5 Triad Center 
Suite 585 
Salt Lake City', Utah 84180 
Phone: (801) 359-9216 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Crossclaim Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
GILBERT ana MAUD KIMBALL, et ai 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR 
TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 6211 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL, 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MELVIN FLETCHER and PEGGY 
FLETCHER, et al., 
Counterclaim-Crossclaimants. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Robert Felton, attorney for Kimballs, hereby submits this 
Memorandum in support of his Motion for a New Trial filed in the 
above-entitled action. 
JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS SIGNED BY THE COURT 
FAIL TO REPRESENT THE COURT'S RULING 
Kimballs, by and through their attorney, hereby move this 
Court that a new trial be granted for and on the ground that the 
Findings and Judgment are in such disarray and contrary to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ruling of this Court that substantial justice demands a new 
trial. The Judgment and Findings which were* submitted by counsel 
for Fletchers do not reflect the ruling of this Court and it is 
submitted that counsel's alteration of the ruling is, in and of 
itself, persuasive evidence of the error in this Court's ruling. 
On Page 3 of this Memorandum are two diagrams which roughly 
delineate the property addressed after the trial in this 
action. The top diagram describes the distribution of the 
property in accordance with the Recorder's transcript of the 
Court's ruling dated September 6, 1985. 
The lower diagram describes the property distribution as 
reflected by the Judgment and Findings executed by the Court. 
As can be clearly seen, the distribution of Parcels "A" and 
"B" on the' attached diagram differ significantly from the 
conclusion at trial and that reflected in the written Judgment. 
In addition to the differences between the Ruling and the 
written Judgment, either distribution of the property is so 
fatally flawed as to require a new trial. At the commencement of 
the trial both counsel for Sweeny and counsel for Fletchers 
stated that they made no claim to Parcel "A", the Hersheiser 
Parcel, and counsel for Kimballs moved for an Order quieting 
title in that parcel to them. The Court denied the Motion with 
leave to reconsider it after hearing the evidence (Findings of 
Fact Pg. 2 ) . 
In the Judgment of the Court the parcel of property to which 
neither Sweeney nor Fletcher claimed any interest was awarded in 
one case 100% to Sweeneys and in the other case (written Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A - Hersheiser Parcel 
C - 30' Strip 
E - Kimball Parcel 
W 
}\»\Lj J 
Uf. )r> 
RULING FROM THE BENCH 
A - Sweeney 100% 
B - Fletcher 100% 
C - Fletcher 100% 
D - Fletcher 100% 
E - Kimball 100% 
tr:-'J 
WRITTEN JUDGMENT 
A - Sweeney 50%; Kimball 50% 
B - Sweeney 50%; Kimball 50% 
C - Fletcher 100% 
D - Fletcher 100% 
E - Kimball 100% 
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Judgment) divided 50% to Sweeney and 50% to Kimball* Not only 
was there no evidence submitted by Sweeney as to ownership of 
this parcel of property, they expressly never claimed an interest 
in it yet the ruling awards it to them anyway. 
The written judgment awards the northern half of the 30 foot 
strip designated on the diagram as Parcel "B" 50% to Sweeneys and 
50% to Kimballs, yet Kimballs' claim to the entire 30 foot strip 
(Parcels MC" and "B") is exactly the same. There is no evidence 
nor justification to somehow delineate Parcels "B" and "C" and it 
is submitted that if Kimball maintain a 50% interest in Parcel 
"B" then they should also have a 50% interest in Parcel "C". 
THE COURT APPLIED THE WRONG BURDEN OF PROOF AND LAW 
AND SAID APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
The ruling of the Court from the bench set forth that 
Fletchers, by a preponderance of the evidence, used the 30 foot 
strip adversely against Kimballs* In the next paragraph, at 
least as to the main parcel of property, the Court states that 
the Kimballs have failed to satisfy their burden of proof against 
a co-tenant as set forth in Olwell v. Clark 658 P.2d 585 
(1982). The claim which Fletchers assert to Parcels "B" and MC" 
(the 30 foot strip) arises directly out of their claim of co-
tenancy with Kimballs. That co-tenancy cannot be terminated 
unless it meets the higher standards set forth in Olwell supra. 
The Notice of Probate Distribution filed by Mr. Kinghom 
described the entire parcel of property (Parcels "A", "B", "C"t 
"D" and "E") demonstrating a clear position that Fletchers1 
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\ 
interest was claimed to be as a co-tenant and the ruling applies 
the Strieker standard against Kimball while ignoring the 
relationship in distributing the other parcels. The Findings of 
Fact (Paragraph 8) also asserts that the entire parcel is the 
property deeded to Kimballs in 1940. 
These facts considered in conjunction with those cited 
earlier demonstrate that the ruling is so .confused and the law 
has been applied so randomly that a new trial is the only logical 
way to straighten out the ownership of this property and place it 
in the proper hands. 
THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE LAW REGARDING 
ADVERSE POSSESSION AND PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
In its ruling from the bench, this Court stated that the 
only difference between adverse possession and a prescriptive 
easement was the length of time each took to vest (excluding 
payment of taxes). This misapprehension of the law of this State 
is a major error in the ruling. The Court's ruling stated that 
Fletchers received title to the 30 foot strip (even though that 
is changed in the written judgment). There is no dispute that 
Fletchers paid no taxes on the property and, therefore, cannot 
acquire title by adverse possession as set forth in § 78-12-12 
U.C.A. (1953). 
Since there can be no adverse possession in Fletchers, the 
only right which can be acquired is one by prescription. The 
Court's ruling quieted title in the 30 foot strip to the 
Fletchers, it did not grant them an easement across it. The 
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Court has, very simply, confused the acquisition of title 
pursuant to the adverse possession statute with the right of use 
as against the fee title holder acquired by continuous years of 
use. The Court has granted fee title in Fletchers which is 
impossible under the Doctrine of Prescription. 
It is further submitted that the only evidence as to use of 
the 30 foot parcel by Fletchers which can conceivably be 
construed to meet the requirements of prescriptive easement 
(excluding the issue of co-tenancy) was for a driveway accessing 
the rear of his house. The evidence and plat submitted into 
evidence clearly delineates the alleged driveway as being eight 
feet wide. The easement, if any, cannot be expanded by Order of 
this Court and must be confined to its historical existence. 
Kimballs submit that the finding of an easement is not 
supported by the evidence but, if the Court sustains itself, that 
the easement can only be eight feet wide and used for a driveway 
because that is the size and use established historically. 
McBride v. McBride 581 P.2d 996 (Utah 1978). 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S VERDICT 
Counsel for Kimballs admits some confusion in the 
application of the facts and the conclusions drawn by the 
Court. At the hearing before this Court on November 4, 1985, it 
was stated that the Court would execute the written documents 
submitted by counsel for Fletchers. This was done in spite of 
the fact> t^at the written Judgment significantly alters the 
ruling of the Court and is not in conformance therewith. The 
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evidence as a whole does not support the Court's ruling either 
from the bench or the written form. A different standard of 
proof was applied in the termination of the co-tenancy between 
Kimball and Fletcher as to Kimballs1 interest but was not applied 
to Fletchers' interest. Fee title was granted to a 30 foot strip 
when only an easement was proven and the distribution of the 
property is not supported by the evidence. 
The Court's'ruling fails to address the easement claimed by 
Kimballs over the 30 foot strip. If Fletchers have an easement 
to the 30 foot strip north of the Kimball parcel then the issue 
of the prescriptive use of the remaining parcel up to Park Avenue 
must be addressed. This is especially true in light of the 
findings and allegation that Fletchers and Kimballs are co-
tenants. If they are co-tenants then Kimballs should also have 
such an easement. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that this is a complicated case involving 
a lot oi different descriptions and uses of property over a great 
number of years. The resolution of the dispute, however, has 
been further complicated by three significant factors; 
1. The written Judgment and Findings significantly changes 
the property distribution that the Court made at the time of 
trial, 
2. The burden of proof and standard of care as between co-
tenant has been misapplied, and 
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3. The Court has misapprehended the applicable law as to 
quiet title actions and adverse use. 
It is submitted to this Court that there is one apparent 
fact that stands out at the conclusion of these proceedings* 
That fact is that everyone, including the Court, appears 
confused• 
It is respectfully submitted that the only way to unwind 
this web of confiision and at the same time do substantial justice 
to all parties is to grant a new trial where the parties can 
present their proof and clarify the confusion which has arisen 
from these initial proceedings. 
This is a very valuable piece of property located next to a 
ski lift in Park City and the parties deserve a resolution which 
is, to the best of everyone's ability, fair and in accordance 
with the applicable law. It is submitted that the situation as 
it exists now does not rise to that standard. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ / day of Novepte/, 1985. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO 
AMEND JUDGMENT postage prepaid, to Paul Veasey, 50 West Broadway, 
4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Gerald Kinghorn, 10 
Exchange . Place, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on 
this y^5^day of September, 1985 . 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
•i ' 
'•ft' 
To Whom It Nay Concern! 
!f Marion li. Fletcher, el; SiaH Lake City, Utah, do 
; herel'i'i lee Lara that I am the son of Roy Fletcher, formerly a 
resident of Park City, Utah. This document relates to property 
• of Roy Fletcher'known as the Park Avenue property. 
During the lifetime'of my father, I had discussions 
with him regarding this Park Avenue property and the use by him 
of the adjacent Kimball property. The 3 egal description and-a 
torial survey of the Kimball property is displayed on the 
page attached hereto. My father acknowledged the ownership of 
the Kimball property by Gilbert John Kimball and Maude S. Kim-
ball, his wife, having stated that his use of the roadways and 
buildings and his use of the Kimball property was by peieiiaaion 
of Gilbert J Kimball under a revokable agreement my father had 
worked out with him. The above recitation has also always been 
my understanding of the matter. 
* -It was my fat .tier's understanding that at any time 
Gilbert J, Kimball would request, the improvements placed on 
the Kimball property would be subject to removal by ray father 
without compensation, and use of the Kimball property discontinued* 
Dated this JL (& day of <U^<* , 1980. :h^^f 
LRION G. FLETCHER 
Signed and delivered 
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SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE 
1, Robert B. Jones. Salt lake City, Utah, do hereby certify that I an * rtglst 
%r*A land Surveyor and that 1 hold License No. 1525, as prescribed by the laws of 
the State of Utah, and 1 have made a survey of the following described property: 
Beginning at a point .North 23° 3U' 'Jest 85.97 feetAfrom the Southeast corner 
of Block 7, /tended Plat of Park City in Section 16, Township 2 South, Rift* 4 East 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South 61° 10' West 73.16 fttti thenc 
North 20* 50' West 123.59 feet; thence North 61° 10* East 33.90 feet; thence North 
28* 50* West 30.00 feet; thence North 64° IT East 17.00 feet; thence South 43* 13* 
£a*t 56.5Q feet; thence South 33' 25" East 103.30 feet to the point of beginning. 
I further certify that the above plat correctly shows the true d1aens10HS 
Of the property surveyed and of the vUible improvements located therton and their 
position on the said property; and further that none of the visible Improvements oi 
the above described premises encroach upon adjoining properties and that no v1s1bl( 
Improvements, fences or eaves of adjoining properties encroach upon the above des-
cribed property, except as shown. 
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78-12-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
limitation period, as affected by statutes 
defining commencement of action, or ex-
pressly relating to interruption of running 
of limitations, 27 A. L. R. 2d 236. 
Validity and construction of war enact-
ments in United States suspending opera-
tion of statute of limitations, 137 A. L. R. 
1440, 140 A. L. R. 1518. 
Validity of contractual time period, 
shorter than statute of limitations, for 
bringing action, 6 A. L. R. 3d 1197. 
Validity of statute enlarging limitation 
period, 79 A. L. R. 2d 1080. 
War as suspending running of limita-
tions in absence of specific statutory pro-
vision to that effect, 149 A. L. R. 1457, 
150 A. L. R. 1420, 151 A. L. R. 1456, 152 
A. L. R. 1452, 153 A. L. R. 1422, 154 A. L. 
R. 1448, 155 A. L. R. 1452, 156 A. L. R. 
1450, 157 A. L. R. 1450, 158 A. L. R. 1450. 
What s tatute of limitations applies to 
action for contribution against joint tort-
feasor, 57 A. L. R. 3d 927. 
What statute of limitations applies to 
action for surplus of proceeds, from sale 
of collateral, 59 A. L. R. 3d 1205. 
What statute of limitations covers ac-
tion for indemnity, 57 A. L. R. 3d 927. 
What s tatute of limitations governs ac-
tion for interference with contract or other 
economic relations, 58 A. L. R. 3d 1027. 
When statute of limitations commences 
to run against action based on fraud in 
construction, repair, or equipment of 
building, 150 A. L. R. 778. 
When statute of limitations commences 
to run against promise to pay debt "when 
able," "when convenient" or the like, 28 
A. L. R. 2d 786. 
Withdrawal of foreign corporation from 
state as tolling s tatute of limitations as 
to action against corporation, 133 A. L. R. 
774. 
Section 78-12-2. 
78-12-3. 
78-12-4. 
78-12-5. 
78-12-5.1. 
78-12-5.2. 
78-12-5.3. 
78-12-6. 
78-12-7. 
78-12-7.1. 
78-12-8. 
78-12-9. 
78-12-10. 
78-12-11. 
78-12-12. 
78-12-12.1 
78-12-13. 
78-12-14. 
78-12-15. 
78-12-16. 
78-12-17. 
78-12-18. 
78-12-19. 
78-12-20. 
78-12-21. 
ARTICLE 1 
REAL PROPERTY 
Actions by the state. 
Actions by patentees or grantees from state. 
When letters patent are declared void. 
Seizure or possession within seven years necessary. 
Seizure or possession within seven years—Proviso—Tax ti t le. 
Holder of tax title—Limitations of action or defense—Proviso. 
Definition of " t ax t i t le" [and "act ion"—Separabil i ty] . 
Actions or defenses founded upon title to real estate. 
Adverse possession—Possession presumed in owner. 
Adverse possession—Presumption—Proviso—Tax title. 
Under written instrument or judgment. 
What constitutes adverse possession under wri t ten instrument. 
Under claim not founded on writ ten instrument or judgment. 
What constitutes adverse possession not under wri t ten instrument. 
Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. 
. Possession and payment of taxes—Proviso—Tax title. 
Adverse possession of public streets or ways. 
Possession of tenant deemed possession of landlord. 
Possession not affected by descent cast. 
Action to redeem mortgage of real property. 
When more than one mortgagor. 
Actions to recover estate sold by guardian. 
Actions to recover estate sold by executor or administrator. 
Minority or disability prevents running of period. 
Disabilities enumerated—Time of not reckoned. 
78-12-2. Actions by the state.—The state will not sue any person for 
or in respect to any real property, or the issues or profits thereof, by 
reason of the right or title of the state to the same, unless: 
(1) Such right or title shall have accrued within seven years before 
any action or other proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or 
(2) The state or those from whom it claims shall have received the 
rents and profits of such real property, or some part thereof, within 
seven years. 
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LIMITATION OP ACTIONS 78-12-5 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-2 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
School land. 
Board of education may lose by adverse 
possession title to property that is not 
used for school purposes, but is held for 
sale as business property. Pioneer Tnv. & 
Trust Co. v. Board of Education of Salt 
Lake City, 35 U. 1, 99 P. 150, 136 Am. 
St. Rep. 1016. 
Collateral References. '-
Limitation of Actions<@=»ll(l). 
53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 15. 
51 Am. Jur . 2d 661, 888, Limitation of 
Actions §§ 84, 416. 
78-12-3. Actions by patentees or grantees from state.—No action can 
be brought for or in respect to real property by any person claiming 
under letters patent or a grant from this state, unless the same might 
have been commenced by the state as herein specified, in case such patent 
had not been issued or grant made. 
issuance of the patent , and not from 
date of final payment for the land. Steele 
v. Boley, 7 U. 64, 24 P. 755, following 
Redfield v. Parks, 132 U. S. 239, 33 L. Ed. 
327, 10 S. Ct. 83, and overruling Steele v. 
Boley, 6 U. 308, 22 P. 311. 
Collateral References. 
Public Lands<§=>114, 181. 
73 C.J.S. Public Lands § 246. 
63 Am. Jur . 2d 594, Public Lands § 125. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-3 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Patentees. 
The statute of limitations begins to 
run against the patentee of public lands 
from the United States from date of 
78-12-4. When letters patent or declared void.—When letters patent 
or grants of real property issued or made by the state are declared void 
by the determination of a competent court, an action for the recovery 
of the property so conveyed may be brought either by the state, or by 
any subsequent patentee or grantee of the property, his heirs or assigns, 
within seven years after such determination, but not after that period. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 104-12-4.
 P u b i i c Lands<&=>119, 121, 122, 181. 
Compiler's Notes. £3 C.J.S Public Lands § 255^ 
m i . _ 63 Am. Jur . 2d 561 et seq., Public Lands 
This section is identical to former sec- c 93
 e^ s e q 
tion 104-2-4 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
78-12-5. Seizure or possession within seven years necessary.—No action 
for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or 
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within 
seven years before the commencement of the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-5. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is similar to section 104-
2-5 (Code 1943) which was repealed by 
Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section 104-2-5 
was amended by Laws 1951, ch. 19, § 1; 
that provision is compiled as 78-12-5.1 
herein. The Supreme Court held the 
amendment was valid despite the repeal 
of section 104-2-5. 
Cross-References. 
Marketable record ti t le, 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
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LIMITATION OP ACTIONS 78-12-5.1 
I t was not error to dismiss complaint in 
action to quiet title, where the evidence 
clearly showed a continuous open, hostile 
and adverse possession by defendant and 
his predecessors in interest for a period 
of more than seven years before appel-
lant commenced her action. Bozievich v. 
Slechta, 109 U. 373, 166 P. 2d 239. 
I t is well settled in this state that a 
person holding property under a defec-
tive tax title for a period of seven years 
is doing so adversely to the claim of own-
ership to such property by the delinquent 
tax debtor owner. Valley Inv. Co. v. Los 
Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 119 U. 169, 225 
P. 2d 722. 
Plaintiff acquired title by adverse pos-
session where it enclosed land with fence, 
built improvements, created artificial lake, 
paid taxes, grazed land and conducted 
commercial enterprise thereon for seven 
consecutive years and defendant never at-
tempted to assert possession. Falconaero 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley Inv. Co., 16 U. 
(2d) 77, 395 P . 2d 915. 
Waiver or loss of right to plead statute. 
Where husband commenced action to 
have property which was held in wife's 
name regarded as being held in t rust 
for him, while wife's divorce proceeding 
was pending against him, and spouses en-
tered into agreement that if husband 
would dismiss his suit to recover prop-
erty wife would dismiss her action for 
divorce, and in pursuance of this agree-
ment, husband dismissed his suit but wife 
prosecuted her action to final decree, her 
conduct constituted palpable fraud and her 
plea of s tatute of limitation could not 
prevail in subsequent suit by husband. An-
derson v. Cercone, 54 U. 345, 180 P. 586. 
Collateral Eeferences. 
Limitation of Actions<§=319(l). 
53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 34 
et seq. 
51 Am. Jur . 2d 661 et seq., Limitation of 
Actions § 84 et seq. 
Commencement of running of statute of 
limitations respecting actions by owners 
of right of re-entry, or actions against 
third persons by reversioners, 19 A. L. R. 
729, 144 A. L. R. 1383. 
Statute of limitations applicable to ac-
tion for encroachment, 24 A. L. R. 2d 903. 
When does cause of action accrue, for 
purposes of s tatute of limitations, against 
action based upon encroachment of build-
ing or other structure upon land of an-
other, 12 A. L. R. 3d 1265. 
When statute of limitations or laches 
commences to run against action to set 
aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer in 
fraud of creditors, 100 A. L. R. 2d 1094. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Action by minor. 
Action by minor within two years after 
he had at tained majority, to recover real 
estate, was not barred although adminis-
trator was not discharged, since rule tha t 
heirs are barred where administrator is 
barred was inapplicable, property being 
distributed to minor under 75-12-8 (since 
repealed). Robbins v. Duggins, 61 U. 542, 
216 P. 232. 
Amendment ineffective. 
In action to quiet title against par ty 
claiming adversely under t ax deed from 
county, held that 1943 amendment to 
former 104-2-5 was ineffective and did not 
reduce time within which plaintiff might 
bring such action from seven to four 
years, in view of the fact that former 
104-2-5.10 had been declared unconstitu-
tional. Valley Inv. Co. v. Los Angeles & 
S. L. R. Co., 119 U. 169, 225 P . 2d 722. 
78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within seven years—Proviso—Tax title. 
—No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof 
shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or 
possessed of such property within seven years from the commencement of 
such action; provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses 
brought or interposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or 
determine the ownership of real property against the holder of a tax title 
to such property, no such action or defense shall be commenced or inter-
posed more than four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, 
or transfer creating such tax title unless the person commencing or inter-
posing such action or defense or his predecessor has actually occupied or 
been in possession of such property within four years prior to the com-
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78-12-6 JUDICIAL CODE 
Definition of "Action." 
The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims 
and cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is 
sought. 
Invalidity in Part. 
If any section or part of section 
shall not invalidate the remaining porti 
History: C. 1943, 104-2-5.11, enacted by 
L. 1951, ch. 19, § 3. 
Construction. 
Failure of county auditor to attach his 
affidavit to county assessment roll did not 
void auditor's tax deed to county since 
term " tax t i t le," as defined by this section, 
of this act shall be held invalid, it 
ons of this act. 
would indicate that legislature intended to 
include within statutes of limitation tnx 
titles which were init iated by tax sales 
the records of which would not show that 
each statutory step had been followed with 
exactitude. Layton v. Holt, 22 U. (2d) 
138, 449 P. 2d 986. 
78-12-6. Actions or defenses founded upon title to real estate.—No 
cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an action, founded upon 
the title to real property or to rents or profits out of the same, shall 
be effectual, unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action, or 
interposing the defense or counterclaim, or under whose title the action 
is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, prede-
cessor or grantor of such person was seized or possessed of the property 
in question within seven years before the committing of the act in respect 
to which such action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim made. 
of water, there must be seven years ' 
continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, noto-
rious, adverse enjoyment, under claim of 
title, with knowledge and acquiescence of 
the person having the prior right. Accord-
ingly, no such title can be acquired in 
excess of the amount awarded by the 
court's decree. Utah Power & Light Co. 
v. Richmond Irr . Co., 80 U. 105, 13 P. 2d 
320, following Spring Creek Irr . Co. v. 
Zollinger, 58 U. 90, 197 P . 737. 
Applicability of section. 
This section does not apply to private 
rights of way or to any other class of 
easement by prescription. Harkness v. 
Woodmansee, 7 U. 227, 26 P. 291. 
Any person who claims title to, or an 
interest in, or lien upon, any real estate 
may invoke aid of s tatute of limitations 
as against claimant whose claim is prior 
in time to person invoking aid of statute, 
when prior claim has been barred by 
statute of limitations. Boucofski v. Jacob-
sen, 36 U. 165, 104 P . 117, 26 L. R. A. (N. 
S,) 898. 
This section governs an action for com-
pensation for taking of land by public 
service company without plaintiff's con-
sent and without condemnation. Salt Lake 
Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 46 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-6. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-6 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Cross-References. 
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
"Actions." 
Procedure to collect special improvement 
taxes as provided in city ordinance was 
held not to be an "action" within meaning 
of this section. Petterson v. Ogden City, 
111 U. 125, 176 P . 2d 599. 
Adjoining landowners. 
Title by adverse possession cannot be 
claimed in the face of an agreement be-
tween ndjoining landowners. Warren v. 
Mazzuchi, 45 U. 612, 148 P. 360. 
In dispute between adjoining landowners 
respecting water rights, where no rights 
are either established or lost by course of 
conduct in particular case, s tatute of limi-
tations does not apply. Campbell v. Nunn, 
78 U. 316, 2 P. 2d 899. 
Adverse right to water. 
To acquire an adverse right to the use 
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LIMITATION OP ACTIONS 78-12-8 
Cross-References. 
Marketable record ti t le, 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq. 
Payment of taxes. 
Redemption from a t ax sale does not 
constitute a payment of taxes, and a t ax 
title claimant who failed to show a pay-
ment of taxes even though in possession 
for more than seven years could not quiet 
title as against the record title holders. 
Lyman v. National Mtg. Bond Corp., 7 
U. (2d) 123, 320 P . 2 d 322. 
The holders of a t ax t i t le could not 
quiet t i t le as against the record title hold-
Commencement of running of statute. 
In action for possession of land, s ta tute 
of limitations does not begin to run until 
true owner's right of possession has been 
so invaded as to give rise to cause of 
action so that where true owner's r ight to 
possession of land had not been so dis-
turbed or encroached upon, s ta tute did not 
begin to run. Scott v. Hansen, 18 U. (2d) 
303, 422 P . 2d 525. 
Contract to purchase. 
Contract to purchase is not a wri t ten 
instrument under which color of t i t le can 
be based in order to gain ti t le within seven 
years pursuant to this section. Memmott 
v. Bosh, 520 P . 2d 1342. 
Cotenants. 
This s ta tute does not run between eoten-
ers, who had been out of possession, even 
though the tax title claimants had been 
in possession for more than seven years 
and had paid taxes or redeemed the prop-
erty from taxes during the period. Lyman 
v. National Mtg. Bond Corp., 7 TJ. (2d) 
123, 320 P . 2d 322. 
Collateral References. 
Adverse Possession<§=a87. 
2A C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 277. 
3 Am. Jur . 2d 346, Adverse Possession 
§ 249. 
Void tax deed, tax sale certificate, and 
the like, as constituting color of title, 
38 A. L. R. 2d 986. 
Minors. 
Seven-year period for adverse possession 
began to run upon delivery of the so-called 
guardian's deed executed after the wards 
at tained their majority. Memmott v. Bosh, 
520 P . 2d 1342. 
"Open" and "continuous" possession. 
Evidence held to show that possession 
of lot by defendant as yard in connec-
tion with his blacksmith shop was of 
continuous and open character required 
by statute for t i t le by possession under 
color of title. Bingham Livery & Trans-
fer Co. v. McDonald, 37 U. 457, 110 P . 56. 
Where defendant, in possession of lot 
used as yard in connection with his 
blacksmith shop, permitted teamsters, ped-
dlers, and others who had occasion to do 
so to use i t as campground when such 
78-12-8. Under written instrument or judgment.—Whenever it appears 
that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into possession 
of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding 
such claim upon a written .instrument as being a conveyance of the 
property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent 
court, and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of 
the property included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some 
part of the property under such claim, f ^ H^YfTi yQfly<?j thp property 5° 
included is deemed to have been held adversely, except that when the 
property so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the possession 
of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other lot of the same tract. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, ants unless and until there is manifested 
Supp., 104-12-8. ' a determination on the par t of one in 
possession to exclude the other cotenants. 
Compiler's Notes. Memmott v. Bosh, 520 P . 2d 1342. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-8 (Code 1943) which was re- Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Statutory methods of acquiring ti t le by 
adverse possession, set out in former sec-
Cross-References, tions 104-2-7 through 104-2-12, were held 
Marketable record ti t le, 57-9-1 et seq. to be exclusive. Jenkins v. Morgan, 113 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. U. 534, 196 P . 2d 871. 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-9 
Forged deed or bond for title as con-
stituting color of title, 68 A. L. R. 2d 452. 
Grantor's possession as adverse posses-
sion against grantee, 39 A. L. It. 2d 353. 
Judgment or decree as constituting color 
of title, 71 A. L. R. 2d 404. 
Necessity of actual possession to give 
title by adverse possession under invalid 
tax title, 22 A. L. R. 550. 
Possession by stranger claiming under 
conveyance by cotenant as adverse to 
other cotenants, 32 A. L. R. 2d 1214. 
Scope and application of the doctrine 
that one cannot successfully claim ad-
verse possession under color of title where 
he has deprived himself or been deprived 
of the color relied on, 136 A. L. R. 1349. 
Tacking adverse possession of area not 
within description of deed or contract, 17 
A. L. R. 2d 1128. 
What informalities, irregularities or de-
fects in respect to execution of a tax 
deed prevent running of statute of limita-
tions or period of adverse possession, 113 
A. L. R. 1343. 
Writing as essential to color of title in 
adverse occupant of land, 2 A. L. R. 1457. 
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under written instrument. 
—For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person 
claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or 
decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following 
cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) Where it lias been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of 
fuel, or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage 
or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the 
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not 
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county 
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-9. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-9 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Cross-Beferences. 
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
Applicability of section. 
This section does not apply to pr ivate 
rights of way or to any other class of 
easement by prescription. I t can only be 
applied by analogy. Where a person opens 
a way for the use of his own premises, 
and another person uses it also without 
causing damage, the presumption is, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, that 
such use by the lat ter was permissive, and 
not under claim of right. Harkness v. 
Woodmansee, 7 U. 227, 26 P. 291. 
Evidence of adverse possession. 
Where plaintiffs asserted title by writ-
ten instrument and adverse possession, 
evidence that plaintiffs and their prede-
cessors had paid all taxes for over thir ty 
years and that the property had been 
occupied by the plaintiffs, their prede-
cessors, or tenants for commercial purposes 
for a like period established hostile and 
adverse use for a period beyond the statu-
tory requirement. Michael v. Salt Lake 
Inc. Co., 9 U. (2d) 370, 345 P. 2d 200. 
Evidence that plaintiffs in an action 
to quiet title had the tract in question 
inclosed, along with a larger tract, by an 
electrified barbed wire fence, placed sta-
bles and other improvements thereon, pas-
tured horses there, and paid all taxes 
for a period of seven years in accordance 
with 78-12-12, all the while being in 
exclusive and uninterrupted possession of 
the tract, clearly established good title by 
adverse possession. Falconaero Enterprise, 
Inc. v. Bowers, 16 U. (2d) 202, 398 P. 2d 
206. 
Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
Statutory methods of acquiring title by 
adverse possession, set out in former sec-
tions 104-2-7 through 104-2-12, were held 
to be exclusive. Jenkins v. Morgan, 113 
U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871. 
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LIMITATION OP ACTIONS 78-12-12 
wlien it was suitable only for placer min-
ing, where another subsequently and sur-
reptitiously located and filed placer claim 
covering land. Springer v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 67 U. 590, 248 P. 819. 
Defendants failed to establish occupa-
tion or possession of certain land within 
limits of requirements of this section, 
where only evidence of possession con-
sisted of use by defendants of that land 
for grazing of their cattle, which use 
was not exclusive inasmuch as third per-
son used the land for same purpose to 
knowledge of defendants without inter-
vention or complaint on their part . Jenkins 
v. Morgan, 113 U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871. 
Repairs and improvements made by co-
tenants in possession to dwellings, build-
ings and fences were insufficient to put 
other cotenants on notice that cotenants 
in possession were claiming title adversely 
to them, since such acts were normally 
consistent with tenancy in common and 
not adverse to it. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 
U. 303, 199 P. 2d 542. 
Maintenance of a fence, payment of 
taxes, and other evidence of possession 
and occupation for over twenty years 
were sufficient to establish ownership as 
against city's claim. Gibbons v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 6 U. (2d) 219, 310 P. 2d 513. 
Collateral References. 
Adverse Possession<§=»19-21. 
2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 et seq. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; 0. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-12. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-12 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section 
104-2-12 was amended by Laws 1951, ch. 
19, § 1 ; that provision is compiled as 78-
12-12.1 herein. The Supreme Court held 
the amendment was valid despite the re-
peal of section 104-2-12. 
Cross-References. 
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq. 
Acquisition of title in general. 
Where claimant under claim of owner-
3 Am. Jur . 2d 97 et seq., Adverse Pos-
session § 19 et seq. 
Acquisition by user or prescription of 
right of way over uninclosed land, 46 A. L. 
R. 2d 1140. 
Adverse possession based on encroach-
ment of building or other structure, 2 A. 
L. R. 3d 1005. 
Adverse possession involving ignorance 
or mistake as to boundaries—modern 
views, 80 A. L. R. 2d 1171. 
Adverse possession of common, 9 A. L. R. 
1373. 
Adverse possession of railroad r ight of 
way, 50 A. L. R. 303. 
Cutting of timber as adverse possession, 
170 A. L. R. 887. 
Crazing of livestock or gathering of nat-
ural crop as fulfilling traditional elements 
of adverse possession, 48 A. L. R. 3d 818. 
Possession by widow after extinguish-
ment of dower as adverse to heirs or their 
privies, 75 A. L. R. 147. 
Reputation as to ownership or claim as 
admissible on question of adverse posses-
sion, 40 A. L. R. 2d 770. 
Use by public as affecting acquisition by 
individual of right of way by prescription, 
111 A. L. R. 221. 
Use of property by public as affecting 
acquisition of title by adverse possession, 
56 A. L. R. 3d 1182. 
ship went into actual possession of certain 
lots which had been sold to county for 
unpaid taxes, and immediately thereafter 
fenced lots and commenced to improve 
them, subsequently receiving deed from 
county, held possession was adverse, from 
time of entry, as to all the world except 
county. Welner v. Stearns, 40 U. 185, 120 
P. 490, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1175. 
Open, notorious and hostile use and pos-
session of the property and payment of 
taxes thereon, all under claim of right, 
will constitute adverse possession. Mans-
field v. Neff, 43 U. 258, 134 P. 1160. 
Where defendant and his predecessors 
had been in actual, open, and adverse 
possession of land for statutory period, 
and for seven successive years had paid 
taxes thereon, and they were inclosed, 
occupied, and cultivated, title was ae-
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.—In no case 
shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of 
any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lako County Utah 
FEB 111976 
Robert H . Rugger i , Esq. 
Attorney for Executr ix 
Off ice and Post Office Address: 
59 East Center S t ree t 
Box 310, M o a b , Utah 84532 
801-259-5611 
IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T , 
IN A N D FOR S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E OF U T A H 
In the Mat te r of the Estate of 
R O B E R T W . K I M B A L L , 
also known as 
R O B E R T K I M B A L L , 
also known as 
R O B T . W . K I M B A L L , and 
being one and the same person, 
P R O B A T E NO. 62327 
Deceased. 
D E C R E E O F D I S T R I B U T I O N 
E L I Z A B E T H W . K I M B A L L , Executr ix of the Estate of Robert W . K i m b a l l , 
a lso known as Robert K i m b a l l , also known as Robt. W . K i m b a l l , and being one and 
the same person, and hereinafter for aonvenience re fer red to as Robert W . K i m b a l l , 
j g ^ ^ ^ W 
deceased, having on the ££ day c?*slSs&»yy A . D . , 1976, fi led In this Court her 
Pet i t ion , setting fo r th , among other things, that a l l accounts in said Estate have 
been paid and f inal ly settled; that said Estate Is now In a condition to be closed; that 
a portion of said Estate remains to be distributed and Petit ioner prays therein that 
the residue and the whole of said Estate be distributed to Elizabeth W . K i m b a l l , 
the person entitled to receive the entire and whole of said Estate , and said matter 
coming on regular ly to be heard this / / day oC2a$Liary, A . D . , 1976, this 
Court proceeds to the hearing of said Pet i t ion. 
It appearing to the satisfaction of this Court that the C lerk duly fixed the 
t ime and place for the hearing of said Petit ion and gave due notice thereof as r e -
quired by law; that a l l Accounts have been ful ly settled; that a l l taxes against the 
property of said Estate have been paid; that there is no inheritance tax due and 
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owlng f rom the said Estate to the State of Utah, nor to the United States of 
Amer ica ; that the residue of said Estate , and the whole thereof, consisting of 
the real and personal property hereinafter part icular ly described and re fer red 
t o , Is now ready for distr ibut ion. 
And I t further appearing to the Court that Robert W . K i m b a l l , deceased, 
died testate on the 20th day of M a r c h , A . D . , 1975 at Sal t Lake C i t y , Sa l t Lake 
County, State of Utah; that said deceased at the t ime of his death was a resident 
of Sal t Lake C i t y , Utah; that said deceased left surviving him as his sole legatee 
and devisee under his Last W i l l and Testament , his w i f e , Elizabeth W . K i m b a l l , 
now residing at 2283 Garf ie ld Avenue, Sal t Lake C i t y , Utah 84108. 
And it further appearing to the Court that the said Elizabeth W . Kimbal l 
Is now the owner of the whole of said estate and Is enti t led, therefore, to have 
the entire residue and the whole of said estate distributed to her . 
Now, on this // day £j£^e$uary, A « D * > 1976, on motion of Robert H . 
Rugger l , Attorney for said Executr ix , and no objection being made thereto, and 
there being no objection on f i l e , 
I T IS H E R E B Y O R D E R E D , ADJUDGED AND D E C R E E D : 
That the residue and the whole of the Estate of Robert W . K i m b a l l , 
deceased, hereinafter part icular ly described and set forth and now remaining 
In the hands of said Executr ix , together with any and a l l other property which may 
belong to said Estate , whether herein part icular ly mentioned or not, or in which 
said Estate may have any Interest , be , and the same I s , hereby distributed to 
Elizabeth W . K i m b a l l , now residing at 2283 Garf ie ld Avenue, Sa l t Lake C i t y , 
Utah 84108. 
The following Is a part icular description of said residue of said Estate 
re fe r red to in this Decree and of which distribution is ordered, adjudged and 
decreed, as aforesaid , to-wtt : _ ~ -
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R E A L P R O P E R T Y : 
A l l of Lot 4 1 , Bonneville Garden Second Addit ion, according to the 
official plat thereof in Sal t Lake County, State of Utah 
P E R S O N A L PROPERTY: 
1966 Chevrolet 4 door automobile bearing S e r i a l No . 27063 < \ / '-.' 
Savings Account 701 1011819 In the amount of $7 ,399 .07 with ' '; 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association, Sa l t Lake C i t y , Utah. < 
Savings Cert i f icate No. 1787 with Prudential Federa l Savings and Loan 
Sa l t Lake C i t y , Utah 701-0178712 $ 7 , 8 7 8 . 1 9 
200 shares of S i lver King Mining Company ..*•-. I 
70 shares of Amer ican Mutual Building and Loan Company r '* 
267 shares of Amer ican Savings & Loan Association 
5100 shares of Tenabo Consolidated Mines Company 
100 shares of Trappers P r i c e Mining Company 
1330 shares T int lc Coalit ion Mines Company 
1000 shares of Howell Mining Company 
500 shares of Combined M e t a l s , Incorporated 
200 shares Intermountain Petroleum Company 
4000 shares Flagas,taff Bonanza Mining C o . 
500 shares Three Kings Consolidated Mining C o . 
3000 shares Spring Val ley Mining Company 
1000 shares Tuma Corporation of Nevada. 
Dated this // day c4£#ft^ary, A . D . , 1976. 
ATTEST 
w. sncnuKo EVANS 
ci&ix 
/' 
Sfc%*>^| V ^ ; ^ ^ 
/ 
*y -J^ir 
J U D G E 
u &&%vmm, STATE OF UTAH . JEfff'U'l ftW¥ 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKT );^>\)%* [ * ' ; /f \ ^ , , , 
I, THE UNOERSIGNEJJ.SDUf^ OF- THE'PISTniwjv) 
COURT OF SALT L A K E ^ ^ T Y / U r A l ^ n t t ' H F ^ & Y ^ 
CERTIFY THAT THf At t^XE*" m? FCfcC#fyNG 1$ \ ; 
THIS 
H. Oi 
BY 
A TRUE ANO FULL'C^tf.' Of^M 6rti£.KiAL $6Q&> f 
MENT ON FILE IN WYvQ#ICEja.S sBc^d ,©* ! * <• V i - J ' 
WITNESS MY HAtyty^&AC*Oiypk\0 CQUR^? 
EY.dSJ*-^^ S+ ~ '} 
fr ^Jfe/ynt^^^^^ 
• '''^J-^fr* /• 
DAY OF, J _ 
OLEY. 6t,i 
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V Recorded return to: 
H. Kinghorn 
* ^ change Pi. #1000 
^L.C. , Utah 84111 
Property 
, Entry No. 
REQUEST OF £&&f)< <?&£ W1 r^*_ 
F E E ALAN SPRIGGSL SUMMIT CO. RECORDER-
- By \A<S/lfi« 
tL 
$,, ft 47i. 
RECORDED 
+>•& 
-;&-
at ^ - V ^ M 
SPACE ABOVE FOR 
RECORDERS USE 
NOTICE OP PROBATE INDEXhU: 
GRAKTOR: ..„„t>.-^"l ' 
DISTRIBUTION
 &RAm& S _ £ ^ 
LEASED: -A-Tr-t.l 
af fec ted: ABSTRACTED: ft <-'' AT? . 
STAMPED: (^ 
Beginning at a point North 23°38' West 85.97 feet 
and North 33°25' West 46.70 feet from the Southeast • ,... 
Corner of Block 7, Amended Plat of Park City in 
Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Sglt Lake 
Base and Meridian and running thence South 61 10 
West 73.16 feet: thence North 28°50' West 128.59 feet; 
thence North 61010' East 33.90 feet; thgnce North 
28 50' West 30.00 feet; thence North 64 11' East 
17.00 feet; thence South 43°13' East 56.50 feet; 
Thence South 33°25' East 103.30 feet to the point 
of beginning. Recorded herewith as Exhibit 1 is the Decree of Distribution 
in the Matter of the Estate of Roberjt-Kimball, deceased, Probate 
# &£!>*-•% In The District Court fofSs}lt Lake £ounty, Utah. 
ii 
™?;&- " 
•>•''•• ,#«Tttfe'*v25thT day of May personally appeared before me 
,»t j[}G4w^d fh*Kin^*lorn w n o d u l acknowleged to me that he executed 
't*h£f, foregoing Notice. 
< ''' Si " * ' •> i 
*'* or v -^  > 
v.,.,My*^ fc%omm. expires: if^r^lf (& ^ ^ 
Residing in S.L.C. Utah 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND,FOR SALT LAK£ COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
In the Matter of the Estate of : 
ROBERT W. KIMBALL, 
also known as : 
ROBERT KIMBALL, 
also known as : 
ROBT. W. KIMBALL 
and being one and the same : 
person, 
Deceased. 
' ! ! 
/:PROBATE NO. 
• . ' . 
62327 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day of January, 
1984, in the above-entitled court^at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Scott Daniels 
sitting without a jury, and the following proceedings 
were had. 
00-itXV l ! U 
f E B l5l98* 
"t^>^ 
^CH>r t 
'#*?** 
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P R O C E E D I N G S : 
( J a n u a r y 1 8 , 1984
 A , 9 : 1 5 A.M. 
THE COURT: We'll return, then, to the estate of Robert 
W. Kimball, petition of Maud and Gilbert Kimball for 
reappointment of Elizabeth W. Kimball as personal 
representative of the estate. 
MR. FELTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The factual basis for this request today arises or 
is centered about a piece of property located in Park City 
in what is known as the sever of the Depot project right 
in the middle of Park City. There is a Quiet Title action 
which is currently in progress in Summit County and originally 
involved the people who owned the old Coalition Building, 
the Sweeney family which burned down a couple of years ago. 
Mr. Kinghorn's clients, who own or he owns a house 
on Park Avenue, adjacent to that property, and my clients, 
who own a parcel of property between three quarters and 
an acre behind that, they are all three located together 
in Park City. <
 f : 
This case has been pending for a couple of years, I 
believe, though I'm not specific, early in 1983. 
It was discovered on Mr. Kinghorn that Gilbert Kimball, 
my client's deceased brother's name,appeared on an old 
Sheriff's Deed, 1976, I believe. Anyway, it was something 
new that popped up, and it appears in the Record Title. 
After that Mr. Kinghorn's client, Mr. Fletcher, went 
to the decedent's widow, that is, Elizabeth Kimball, who we 
wish to have reappointed and requested a deed. • 
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Now, nothing was paid for this Deed, But approximately 
May of 1983 Elizabeth Kimball executed a Deed to these 
Third Parties. 
THE COURT: Quit claim, right? 
MR. FELTON: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: A Quit Claim Deed? 
MR. FELTON: A Quit. Claim Deed as a person, not 
as a personal representative or anything else, individually 
to the Fletchers for this piece of property. 
So at that point, then, we have the gaps and that. 
We get to this point, Your Honor, and we believe it is proper 
at this point that the Estate be reopened under the • 
statutory authority of 75-3-108-- I'm sorry, 1008, and believe 
this is particularly the situation<contemplated by that 
statute for subsequent administration. * 
There are some facts, I believe, are undisputed, 
Your Honor, and that is, number one, prior to the circumstances] 
surrounding the execution of this Deed, Elizabeth Kimball 
never knew about whatever interest she had in this property. 
It was newly discovered, and I don't think that's disputed. 
There is a second fact, and that is that my clients 
have treated this property as their own for a number of 
years, and they dispute the validity of any interest which 
passed to the beneficiary, Elizabeth Kimball, or subsequently 
to Mr. Kinghorn's client through the Quit Claim Deed. 
Third, there is no personal representative's Deed, 
nor other instrument showing the disposition of this property 
out of the Estate, nor is there real property either in the 
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inventory, nor the final Deed of distribution.in the Estate 
of Robert Kimball, and in fact, was newly discovered property. 
Now, it may have passed under the residuary clause, true, but 
nobody knew about it, and it's not addressed. Those, I think, 
are undisputed./ •••'*. / . . ..., i-
 t .„ ;. .-.-.., i. 
We have a new piece of property recently discovered. 
There is, and I will address early some — my adversaries 
here state that we are probably not interested parties 
and I would address the Court to 75-1-201(20). That definition 
is cited in both the briefs submitted by Mr. Ruggeri and 
Mr. Kinghorn regarding who is an interested party such that 
they may file the petition for subsequent administration under 
3-1008. And the interested is defined more.than just creditor] 
as a creditor or other very broad language having a property 
right in or claim against the Estate. And we certainly 
assert such a claim as to both the fact that we have ownership 
of a property which has now been purportedly passed through 
the Estate to a Third- Party as well as maybe some other 
claims for that action; namely, the Deed. 
One other thing regarding the closing of the Estate 
of Robert Kimball and that needs to be addressed, and that is 
I will refresh Your Honor's memory, that the new Tax Reform. 
Act went into effect January 1, 1977. This Estate was closed 
almost nine months prior to that time, prior to January 1, 197^ 
The total State Tax exemption was $60,000. It is before 
they had the unified credit. And there may well be Estate 
taxes due, if this piece of property is included in the Estate 
And I'm uncertain because quite honestly Mr. Ruggeri's Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mrs. Kimball won't say it, and we have to determine 
the interest of the estate is here. And it's a necessary 
. To bring a necessary * party, we have to have a 
rial representative. It's as simple as that. 
I haven't filed a complaint and stuff because I don't] 
anybody to sue yet, and that's all we're requesting. 
think it can all be done in Summit County, but we need 
sr party, and to get that party into court, I can't 
30 serve her. I have to have her reappointed and 
Lish her position, and that's our request. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ruggeri. 
MR. RUGGERI: I would like to simply offer one 
:ime that I enter an appearance on behalf of Elizabeth 
LI in the District Court in Summit County and enter 
iimer of any interest coming to her since she is the only 
1, the only litigee , the only devisee is entitled to 
i entire estate. And all we want to do is stop litigating, 
expensive to come up here all the way from Moab. She's -4 
it, my uncle Gibb are partners., We are talking about --
an unfortunate thing. It's causing trouble with me and 
isins who I dearly love. And I don't want to have to do 
tis. 
What we want is out. We'll enter a disclaimer. 
' could complain about that if they are sincere about it 
e she was the only person under the terms of that will 
as entitled to receive anything. 
And then I also say that if the Court has any 
on about it, the probate proceedinas under whirh i-h-i Q I 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY, ) 1 
vs. 
Plaintiff, ) 
GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL, ) | 
MELVIN 
1 PEGGY 
FLETCHER and ) 
FLETCHER, ) 
Defendants. _____) Civil No. 6211 
! GILBERT and MAUD KIMBALL, ) 
VS. 
MELVIN 
PEGGY 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs, j 
* • 1 
FLETCHER and ) 
FLETCHER, ) 
Crossclaim Defendants. ) 
Deposition of: GILBERT KIMBALL 
January 28, 1983 
• 1 
Reported by: Lillian S. Hunsaker 
From the Reporting Offices of: 
Capitol Reporters 
P. O. Box 1477, Salt Uke City, Utah 84110 
(SOD 363-7939 
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A Lynn and Lawrence Kimball. 
Q And were those your father's brothers? • 
A They were my father's brothers. They were partners 
in the livery business. 
Q When did the livery business close down? 
A In 1928—'27 or '28, when I built the garage. 
MRS. KIMBALL: '27. 
Q (By Mr. Felton) And you said you built the garage? 
A Yes. That's the Kimball Art Center now. I built 
it as a garage in 1929, but had a service station on it— 
Q Let me ask the questions, now. 
You say you built a garage there in 1929? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you build it or were you in business with 
somebody else? 
A I had it built by— Sidney Mulcock put up the 
building. Slack Winbern was the architect. 
Q How do you spell his name? 
A I doft't know. 
Q What kind of a garage was this? 
A It was a storage garage and repair, gas and 
service station and garage. 
Q Mr. Kimball, let me show you what has been marked 
Exhibit 2 and could you tell me where your garage was? 
A The garage is here. 
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Q When you say "here"— 
A On the corner of Park Avenue and Heber Avenue. 
Q Would you put a Number "1" where that garage is 
with this pen? . > . • *•.' .*••«•• 
A (Witness complies.) 
Q And put a circle around it. 
A Yes. 
Q Is that where it says "Eley Motor Company"? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was in 1929? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And how long— 
A The livery barn was on this property. 
Q Now, put a Number M2fl there and circle that. 
A (Witness complies.) 
Q And how long did you operate the garage? 
A I operated the service station there from 1926 
until it went out of business in 194 0. 
Q And then after the service station went out of 
business, what happened to the building? 
A It sold t o — Well, it eventually was sold to Eley 
Motor Company. 
Q Did you sell it? 
A No, I lost it. Joe Rozzelle foreclosed on the 
property. 
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Q When was that? u«, 
A That was 1940. 
Q All right. 
Now, on Number 2, where the livery stable was? 
A That was also included in the foreclosure. When 
Mulcock or when Joe Rozzelle took over the property, he took 
over Number 1 and Number 2. 
Q All right. 
Now, let me show you— 
A Number 3 is this property here. 
Q Now, on this Exhibit 2, it has "Gilbert and Maud 
Kimball" on the exhibit. What is that piece of property? 
A That ' s the property back of Eley Motor or back 
of Kimball Art Center. I t i s bounded by the Union Pacific 
Railroad and F l e t c h e r ' s property and Kimball Art Center and 
the Si lver King property. 
Q Did your father ever own that property? 
A My father bought the property in 1924. 
Q From whom? 
A From the Kimball Investment Company. Ed Kimball. 
Q Did you ever get a deed from Summit County for 
that property? 
A Y e s . .-..:.-•• > 
Q Let me show you Exhibit 9 and ask you if that is a 
copy of the deed from Summit County. 
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A Uh-huh ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . T h a t ' s the Quitclaim Deed 
from the County. 
Q Why did Summit County g ive you t h a t ? 
A Back t a x e s . 
Q Did you own the property before that? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have trouble paying the taxes? 
A I let it go for taxes, yes. 
MR. FELTON: Off the record. 
(Recess.) ,. 
Q (By Mr. Felton) Gib, I showed you the wrong deed. 
Excuse me. 
Instead of Exhibit 9, Exhibit 8 is that deed from 
Summit County. 
A Yes. 
Q I didn't look at it very carefully. 
That's the deed from Summit County? 
A Yes. 
Q And you were back on taxes and then redeemed the 
property? 
A Yes. 
Q Nov/, Gib, what I would like you to do a little bit, 
could you tell me back when your father operated the livery 
stable or afterwards, did you ever have any business on any 
of this property? 
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A 
Q 
A 
On this property? 
Any of it. 
Yes. 
Q You have talked about that your father had the 
livery stable on what's marked as Number 2?* 
A Yes-. 
Q And that you had the garage on what is marked 
Exhibit Number 1? 
A Yes. 
Q And those two parcels were foreclosed in 194 0? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Did you ever use any of the other property on 
E x h i b i t 2? -> i •-• 
A I used this property. 
Q That is Number 3? 
A Number 3. 
I moved the little stucco building from the corner 
of Park Avenue and Heber Avenue. 
Q That's from the corner of Number 1? 
A Number 1. I moved the building from Number 1 to 
Number 3 in 1929. 
Q Now, would you put Number "4" on this piece of 
property. 
A Back here (indicating) I built a— 
Q Let me use this as Number 4. . ;< 
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; A Okay. 
Q Now, you moved a building onto Number 3? 
A I moved a building on Number 3, yes. And then I 
installed a.gas pump, a pump station on Number 4 back here 
on the corner to pump gasoline from the railroad up to a big 
tank that I had here. . ..,-.-.••, 
Q Where the pump station is, I'm going to put a 
Number "A." 
All right. 
Is that right? Where you drew? , , > 
About there, yes. ' , 
And when did you install that pump station? 
I installed that in 1928 or '29. It was right 
after we built the garage. 
Q And you said you pumped gas from this station? 
A I bought gasoline in carloads from Park Co., 
Wyoming, and I pumped that gas into a big storage tank that 
was up here on this property.
 n. 
Would you draw in where the storage tajik is. ,
 4.t. 
Well, I had a storage tank in here. 
Can you put a number about in there? 
(Witness complies.) 
I had a tank in here (indicating) right alongside 
the garage. ? , • , 
Q Can I trace those lines right here and put a 
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Number "B" in here? 
A Yes. 
s
 Q And you pumped gas from "A" to flB.H 
Did you pump it through the line? 
A We had a gas line, three-inch pipe line. 
Q Would you draw in approximately where the gas was. 
A The pipe line runs from this pump station up to 
this. 
Q And I111 trace over that line you have just drawn, 
but going between Number "A" and "B"; is that correct? 
A Yes. That was about a two-inch pipe line. 
Q And I've written on there "pipe line." 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q How was the gas delivered? 
* A It was delivered by railroad. 
Q And where did the railroad come in? 
A The railroad come in over the Silver King tracks. 
Q Can you draw a line where the railroad came in? 
A It was in here, down to the terminal building and 
they bring the railroad cars in here. 
Q Could you put the terminal building in? Where is 
the terminal building? 
A Down here on the Silver King property. 
Q Can we mark that as Number "C"? Is that what you 
have drawn in? 
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A Okay. 
Q Is that what used to be called the Coalition 
Building? 
A Yes. 
Q The one that burned down recently? 
... A
 5 . Yes. 
i 
Q And then I will mark "railroad tracks"— 
^ . A The railroad came right up to our property line 
here. 
, »..,, Q I'm going to designate what you have drawn in as 
the railroad tracks as "D" and write railroad tracks underneath 
is that right? \ .v 
A That's right. 
Q Did you have any storage facility at the pump 
station? Is there anything to store gas in? 
A Just the pump house here where we kept our tools 
for hooking up— Just an electric pump. 
Q Were there any underground tanks or anything there? 
A No. The only tank we had was this big tank up 
here. 
Q And the service station closed in 194 0, you said? 
A Yes, 
Q And then what happened to the pump station? 
A Well, it abandoned. It left. Cement footing is 
still in there. 
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Q When you say "in there," you mean Number "A"? 
A Yes. There is a big cement block there that was 
a foundation for the gas pump. 
Q How about the pipe line? Did you ever remove that? 
,,::
 A No. Some of it was removed when the Kimball Art 
Center built a parking lot here. 
Q When you say "here," you mean on part of the 
property between Number 2 and 3? 
A Yes, on Number 2. The Kimball Art Center have 
that little parking lot now, and they took up part of that 
line. 
Q When we have to read this later, we have to identify| 
what you're talking about. So what you're talking about is 
where the parking lot is just east of the Number 7? This is 
north? 
A Yes. 
Q Just east of Number 7 on Exhibit 2? 
A That would be right. 
Q But did you remove any of this pipe line? 
A No. 
Q Do you know if it's there now? 
A Some of it's still in there, I'm sure. 
Q There is on Exhibit Number 2 what looks like 
somebody's drawn in a property line here. It is "south 61 
degrees"--! can't read the rest of it—"33 minutes" and it 
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runs—looks like from Park Avenue up to the corner where you 
had the pump station, Number 8? 
A That's right, , . , 
Q Now, was there ever, to your knowledge, any fences 
in that area? 
A Ever a what? 
Q Fences. i •> 
A Yes, The Silver King Company or the coal company, 
I guess it was— Hopkins Coal Company had a big board fence 
along there, 
Q This is the line you have described? 
A Yes, Along the north line of the Fletcher property 
and along the Silver King property, there was a fence, a 
board fence, so people wouldn't get in there to steal the 
coal. 
Q If I understand your description right, there was 
a board fence running from Park Avenue along the north property! 
line of Fletcher's property to the corner, the Number 8? 
A Yes. 
Q And then running in a northerly direction. 
A Then it run north to the corner. 
Q Can I call that Number 5? 
A Yes, 
Q Did it end there? 
A 1 think the fence ended there. It may have come out 
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here to this property line, I don't know. 
Q When was that fence there? 
A The fence was there all during the Silver King's 
operation. 
Q And when was that? 
A I think they stopped in 1956. 
Q Do you know what happened to the fence after 1956? 
[•> \;j: A I think the King, when they surveyed their property, 
I think they tore the fence down. 
c_- Q Did you see anybody take the fence down? 
A No. 
i vi Q You don't know— 
A I don't know who did it. 
\ ;t Q Have you personally looked at this property on 
Number 4 and Number 3? Have you been out there? 
A Yes. 
Q Many times? 
M- . A Yes. 
Q Have you ever seen anything that looked like a 
survey marker around Number 4? 
A Yes. The. Silver King— 
Q Let me ask you another question. Don't tell me 
about the Silver King survey. 
When did you see anything that looked like a survey 
marker? 
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A When I had it surveyed, it was railroad^ 
Q When was that? 
A In L97 6. 
Q Did you see anything before that? 
A There were markers before that. 
Q What kind of markers? 
A They were pipe with a copper head or a brass head. 
A pipe marker. 
• - Q Can you tell me approximately the first time you 
ever saw them? 
i' A It would be in the 197 0's, or may have been back as 
far as 1960— '61. 
Q Can you tell me, thenf they were pipe with what 
on them? 
A Pipe markers with brass caps. 
Q Can you tell me where they were? 
A They were— There was one located here and one 
here. 
Q When you say "here," show me where. 
A Well, how can I tell you? 
Q You tell me and I will put a black dot there.-
A Yes, one there. 
Q And I'm going to put a Number 6 here and circle 
it with an arrow to the little black dot. 
Is that what you identified? 
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A All right. And there was another one here. 
Q And that's next to the Number 5? 
A Next to the Number 5. ,,, 
i.c .!ZJ Q , All right. 
A And there was another one here. 
Q That is on the corner next to Number A? 
A Number A. 
vki-.,;;.. It seemed to me there was another one-- There is 
one over here on Park Avenue. 
Q Right here about, and I'll put a dot and put the 
Number 7 by it. 
A There was a pipe marker there. 
It seemed to me there was another marker in here. 
.,; Q When you say "in here," you're going to have to 
just point with your pen. 
A Down in here somewhere. 
Q Okay. I'll put the next dot and the Number 8 in 
there somewhere. 
A I haven't been able to find that marker recently, 
but I'm sure there was one there that I saw before. 
That's all grown up v/ith weeds and trees in there 
now. It covers up some of those markers. 
Q How did you get to your pump station? 
A How? 
Q When you used it. 
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1 ; A Oh, went down this road, 
2 Q This road, you mean? 
3 Vw-i A Down what they call Pacific Avenue now. It was the 
4 Utah Central Railroad right-of-way. 
5 Q And that's how you got to the pump station? 
6
 ; A Yes. 
7 L Q Gib, was there ever any driveways or any paths 
8 I through there? i , .: 
9 I A i There was a driveway through here. 
10 Q When we say "through here," let me identify it. 
11 A It paralleled that fence. There was a road come 
12 through there. 
13 Q And I'm going to mark on Number 9 "road;" is that 
14 what you're talking about? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Okay. 
17 Ai That road was used by the coal haulers. They used 
lg to bring the coal in on the Silver King tracks. 
19 Q That is Number "D"? 
20 A Yes. 
21 They would bring coal cars in on the same tracks 
22 that they brought my gas in on. And then the coal haulers 
23 would load the coal out of the coal cars and they would load 
24 it down this road and take it down to the coal scales to be 
25 weighed. 
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Q When did that stop? 
A It stopped about the time people stopped using 
coal* That would be when they changed from coal to gas 
furnaces. Most everybody changed. 
'* L: i.... .• - When was it, Maud? 
1956. 
Q All right. 
A A lot of people used oil. Stopped using coal and 
burned oil for several years before they put in the gas •.: 
furnaces. 
•A r Q Mr. Kimball, do you claim that you have been paying 
taxes on this Number 348? It's actually Parcel Number 4 and 
it's identified on this as ffSA-348." 
A Yes, 
Q Have you been paying taxes on that? 
A I have been paying taxes on that. 
-i Q Do you know how long? 
;
. i A As long as I can remember. It would go back into 
1956. 
-' • Q Let me show you Exhibit Number 10. Do you know 
what that is? 
;*:•;• i A Uh-huh (affirmative). Tax receipt. 
Q It's a tax description, isn't it? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And the number on it is "SA-348"? 
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A That's right. 
Q Now, Gib, did you go over and talk to anyone at 
the County about this property, Number 4? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
. »< Q When did you go over? 
. A I don't remember the date. In 1956 or about that 
time. 
Q That was the first time? .-;;,, .; 
A Yes. 
Q Who did you talk to? 
A To Wanda Spriggs. 
Q And who was she?
 t . : 
A She was the County Recorder. I asked her to show 
me a plat of our property. 
Q Did she show you one? 
A She showed me the plat and it included this 
property. .»,•...»••;,•:•• 
Q Number 4 ? 
A Number 4. 
Q Was that in 1956 or later? 
A It's about 1956. 
But it didn't describe this property. We didn't 
have a proper description on our tax return—our tax notice. 
So I asked her how to get a property description on our tax 
notice. 
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A Yes. That would be the deed. 
'
 :
-
:
" Q Gib, has anyone, as far as Parcel Number 4, 
this piece of property, Number 4 on Exhibit Number 2 — Has 
anybody ever claimed besides Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher, Melvin 
Fletcher, has any other person or company ever told you they 
owned it? 
A No. 
Q Now, are there any buildings on piece Number 3 or 
Number 4 now? 
A Nobody's ever told me that they ever owned that 
property. Fletcher never claimed to own it. 
Q Are there any buildings on Number 3 or 4? 
A Yes. 
Q Let me show you Exhibit Number 1. 
A Yes. 
Q Does that show the buildings? / 
A It shows this little stucco building that I had 
moved from Park Avenue. 
Q Now, I have to do this, because I may have to 
explain this to someone else. 
You're talking about what is identified as a 
^stucco" building? 
A Yes. And that was moved from Park Avenue and 
Heber Avenue to this point. And there is a garage here that 
Ezra Workman--
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~3 
Q Can I mark that on Exhibit Number 1 as "A"? That's 
the garage you said? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And it's shown as a frame shed? 
A Yes, it's a wood shed. 
Q And there's one on there that Mr. Fletcher built? 
A Yes. 
Q And that's Number "B"? 
A Yes. 
Q Which Mr. Fletcher? 
A Roy Fletcher, Melvin's father. Then there is a 
little coal house. 
Q That's Number "c"? 
A That was Fletcher's— 
Q Roy Fletcher's? 
A —and the coal house which was Mr. Workman's. 
Q Number UC"? 
A Yes. 
Q When were these built? 
A I don't know when they were built. As far as I can 
guess, it would be about 1921. It was after the first World 
War, anyway. 
Q Now, the piece of property on Exhibit Number 2 
which is shown as "Melvin H. Fletcher"; who owned that 
property at the time these buildings on Exhibit Number 1 were 
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built? 
A Ezra Workman* 
Q And who owned the parcel on Exhibit Number 2 which 
is identified as Blanche Fletcher? Who owned that at that 
time? 
A Roy Fletcher, Kelvin's father. 
Q What relation was Roy Fletcher to Blanche Fletcher? 
•v ; A Mel Fletcher is the son of Roy Fletcher. 
iw Q Who is Blanche Fletcher? 
A She was Melvin's mother. 
. v , Q Roy's wife? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 
Gib, did you ever talk to Mr. Workman about whose 
property this was where those sheds were built? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q When did this happen? 
A It happened about 1929. About the time that I built 
the garage. 
Q Okay. 
And who did you have the conversation with? 
A With Ez Workman. 
* » Q And was anybody else present? 
A Not that I can recall. 
Q Where were you? 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SWEENEY 
vs. 
GILBERT 
et al., 
' LAND COMP 
Plaintiff, 
1
 and MAUD 
Defendants 
GILBERT and MAUD 
vs. 
MELVIN 
ANY, 
KIMBALL, : 
KIMBALL, : 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs, : 
FLETCHER, et al., : 
Crossclaim Defendants. : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 6211 
Vi'iTn' 
[)\H 7 1.033 
Dcrmtv C U M * -Of 
This matter comes before the Court for clarification and 
further rulings on defendants Gilbert and Maud Kimball's Motion 
for Leave to Amend their Crossclaim as to co-defendants Fletchers 
and proposed additional defendant Kinghorn. The hearing was held 
on December 1, 1983 at the hour of 8:15 a.m., with the Court 
sitting in Salt Lake County with the agreement of counsel. 
Present were Robert Felton on behalf of defendants Kimball, 
0. Wood Moyle, III on behalf of proposed additional party 
Gerald H. Kinghorn, and Gerald H. Kinghorn on behalf of defendants 
•J ^ x 
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Fletcher. The Court on September 22, 1983 issued aTMlnutuH 
denying the Kimballs1 request to amend the Crossclaim to join 
Gerald Kinghorn as a party defendant. The Memorandum did not 
address the second part of the Motion asserted by defendant 
Kimballs to amend their Crossclaim to assert a cause of action 
for slander of title against defendant Fletchers. Counsel argued 
their respective positions, and the Court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the prior Memoranda filed, and 
review certain cases and other legal authorities that may bear 
upon the issue. The Court has now had an opportunity to review 
the authorities cited, and further consider the arguments of 
counsel, and otherwise being fully advised, enters the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
The Court is of the opinion that the same reasoning 
applied to the Motion to Amend their Crossclaim to name attorney 
Kinghorn as a party defendant applies to the proposed Amended 
Crossclaim that would assert a claim for slander of title against 
co-defendants Fletcher. The Court recognizes that the issue 
before the Court is whether or not the Crossclaim should be 
amended, but the matter has been argued on the merits and in view 
of the nature of the ''absolute privilege11 asserted, the Court is 
of the opinion and holds that the proposed Crossclaim against 
Fletchers must also be denied on the basis of the absolute 
privilege that attaches. 
* . • < 
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The Court has reviewed carefully the case cited by counse^ 
Hansen vs. Cohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah, 1976) where the Supreme 
Court discussed the privilege in the filing of a lis pendens. 
The Court notes that the Supreme Court in that case adopted 
the Restatement of Torts, Section 638 of the First Edition, now 
found at Section 582 of the Restatement of Torts 2d, that a party 
to private litigation has an absolute privilege to disparage 
another's property. In the Hansen vs. Cohler case, supra, the 
facts of that case dealt with a lis pendens, and counsel for 
Kimballs argues that the interpretation of the Court's reference 
and adoption of the Restatement of Torts should be limited to a 
lis pendens as opposed to a more broad interpretation which 
might be read from the Restatement of Torts without a factual 
situation dealing with a particular document of alleged 
disparagement. 
This Court is of the opinion that the Supreme Court in 
Hansen vs. Cohler, supra, while dealing with a specific instance 
involving a lis pendens, did not intend to restrict the principles 
announced in that case by adopting the Restatement of Torts to 
questions only involving lis pendens. If in fact that was the 
case, the Supreme Court in the decision could have easily so 
indicated. The fact that the Supreme Court goes on to discuss 
the comments to the Restatement indicate that the Supreme Court 
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absolute privilege under circumstances of private litigation 
or a party allegedly disparages the property of another was to 
be adopted generally, and not to be limited to the specific 
fact situations involving lis pendens. 
Therefore, this Court views the Restatement of Torts 
dealing with this issue as to be the law of the state of Utah, 
and as such the Fletchers, together with their attorney 
Mr. Kinghorn, enjoy an absolute privilege under these circum-
stances. Inasmuch as an absolute privilege applies, the Motion 
to Amend need not and should not be allowed to assert a claim 
of slander of title against the Fletchers as it was not 
allowed in the Court's prior Minute Entry as to Mr. Kinghorn. 
A proposed Order under cover of letter dated August 3, 
1983 from Mr. Moyle to the clerk of the Court in Summit 
County is therefore an appropriate Order when considered in 
light of the Court's additional Memorandum Decision, with the 
exception that the Court will by interlineation add following 
the date of September 6, 1983, the date of December 1, 1983. 
The Court has executed the proposed Order submitted by 
Mr. Moyle with the one interlineation above-referenced, a copy 
is enclosed for counsels' files. Accordingly, a supplemental 
I Vq 
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SWEENEY LAND CO. VS. 
KIMBALL, ET AL PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Order regarding the Motion for Leave to Amelia the Crossclaim 
will not be necessary. 
Dated this 1^ day of De 
'IMTTHYvR. HANSON 
'DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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. PARTIES Rule 2 5 ( a ) ( 2 ) 
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the 
original parties. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 24(b) 
except for deletion of the phrase "of the 
United States" after the word "s ta tu te" 
in subd. (1). 
Cross-Re ference. 
Permissive joinder of parties, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 20. 
Collateral References. 
P a r t i e s ® ^ ? et seq. 
67 C.J.S. Part ies § 53 et seq. 
59 Am. Jur . 2d 558, Part ies § 133. 
Unions: discretionary intervention in 
action between union and union member, 
93 A. L. R. 2d 1037. 
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to 
intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state 
the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth 
the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Rule 24(c) was amended by the Supreme 
Court on June 30, 1965, effective October 
1, 1965. The amendment substituted "the 
parties as provided in Rule 5" for "all the 
parties affected thereby" at the end of 
the first sentence. 
This Rule is similar to the first two 
sentences of Fed. Rule 24(c). 
Cross-References. 
Claims for relief, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 8 (a ) . 
Defenses; form of denials, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 8 (b ) . 
Form for motion to intervene as de-
fendant, Rules of Civil Procedure, Appen-
dix Form 24. 
Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21. 
Motion day; determination of motions 
without hearing, Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 78. 
Collateral References. 
Parties<§=544. 
67 C.J.S. Part ies § 67. 
59 Am. Jur . 2d 604, Part ies § 172. 
RULE 25 
SUBSTITUTION OP PARTIES 
(a) Death. 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the 
court may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substi-
tution may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives 
of the deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be 
served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Unless the 
motion for substitution is made not later than ninety days after the death 
is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the 
death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be 
dismissed as to the deceased party. 
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or 
of one or more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought 
to be enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against 
the surviving defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be 
suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in favor of or 
against the surviving parties. 
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based upon that observation the defendant 
officer practically assumed that the plaintiff 
was the accused. There is undoubtedly 
room for difference of opinion as to wheth-
er the defendant's actions in so assuming 
and taking the plaintiff with him, without 
asking any further questions, and without 
making any explanation, met the requisite 
standard of reasonable diligence and care 
under the circumstances. It is our opinion 
that the issue should have been submitted to 
the jury. Accordingly, it is necessary that 
the case be remanded for that purpose. 
Costs to plaintiff (appellant). 
WADE, C. J., and McDONOUGH and 
CALLISTER, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring in re-
sult). 
I concur in the result, but do not sub-
scribe to the main opinion's attempted dif-
ferentiation between this case and Wendel-
boe v. Jacobson. Where misdemeanors are 
the subject matter, whether the arrest is 
made at night or in the daytime is of no con-
sequence. Nor does the fact that good faith, 
reasonable diligence and care in identifica-
tion are exercised by the arresting officer 
have anything to do with whether the arrest 
is unlawful, except by way of mitigation of 
damages, which may be nominal or great,— 
1. Title 77-13-3, Utah Code Annotated 
1953; Title 77-12, U.C.A.1953. 
2. 22 Am.Jur. 405, sec. 73, False Imprison-
ment. 
a jury question. He risks an unlawful ar-
rest where a misdemeanor is not committed 
or attempted in his presence.1 Even where 
armed with a warrant he takes his chances 
at arresting the wrong person.2 These 
conclusions seem inescapable in the light of 
the clear implications of our statutes, which 
govern the matter. The situation is differ-
ent where felonies are the subject matter. 
The statute protects where reason and care 
are exercised.3 
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Rela Mae Spratllng PARR et al.f 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK et al., 
Defendants, 
Edith Steadman Green and Sheldon Stead-
man, Intervenors and Appellants. 
No. 9668. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 31, 1962. 
Suit was brought to quiet title to realty. 
The intervenors intervened and claimed an 
interest in the realty as heirs of their de-
ceased father. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., 
3. Title 77-13-3(3) and 77-13-3(5) U. 
C.A.1953. 
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rendered a summary judgment quieting title 
in the plaintiffs, and the intervenors ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, C. J., 
held that the right of the intervenors to 
claim an interest in the realty as part of 
their father's estate was barred by seven-
year limitations, where more than seven 
years had elapsed since the father's estate 
was distributed to the guardian of the in-
tervenors and before the guardian was dis-
charged. 
Affirmed. 
Limitation of Actions <&=>I74(2) 
Right of intervenors in suit to quiet 
title to claim interest in realty as heirs of 
their deceased father's estate was barred by 
seven-year limitations, where more than 
seven years had elapsed since father's es-
tate was distributed to their guardian and 
before guardian was discharged. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-12-6, 78-12-8, 78-12-12, 78-12-21. 
Gustin, Richards & Mattsson, Salt Lake 
City, for appellants. 
W. D. Beatie, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondents. 
WADE, Chief Justice. 
This suit was brought to quiet title to 
some land situated in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. The defendant in the action, Zions 
I. "78-12-6. No cause of action, or de-
fense or counterclaim to an action, found-
ed upon the title to real property or to 
rents or profits out of the same, shall 
be effectual, unless it appears that the 
person prosecuting the action, or inter-
posing the defense or counterclaim, or 
First National Bank, successor in interest 
of the Utah Savings & Trust Company, the 
administrator of the Estate of George Al-
bert Steadman, deceased, filed a disclaimer. 
The defendant, Elvina S. Steadman, the 
widow of George Albert Steadman, and the 
mother of the appellants, Edith Steadman 
Green and Sheldon Steadman, defaulted. 
The appellants, Edith Steadman Green and 
Sheldon Steadman intervened in this action 
claiming an interest in the property as the 
heirs of George Albert Steadman. Their 
appeal is from a summary judgment'quiet-
ing title in respondents. 
The complaint alleged that respondents 
and their predecessors in interest had ac-
quired title to the property in question by 
adverse possession for over 15 years. Ap-
pellants' counterclaim alleged that they had 
an interest in the property as children of 
George Albert Steadman, deceased, and that 
seven years had not elapsed since they had 
attained their majority. Respondents' an-
swer to the counterclaim denied that George 
Albert Steadman ever had an interest in 
the property in question. It further alleged 
that the Statute of Limitations, Sections 78-
12-6, 78-12-8 and 78-12-12, U.C.A. 1953 * 
had commenced to run against any cause of 
action they may have had since the ap-
pointment of the Utah Savings and Trust 
under whose title the action is prosecuted 
or defense or counterclaim is made, or 
the ancestor, predecessor or grantor of 
such person was seized or possessed of 
the property in question within seven 
years before the committing of the act 
in respect to which such action is prose-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Company as their guardian on December 11, 
1942, and distribution to it on December 
23, 1942, as such guardian of all the minors' 
interest in the property of the Estate of 
George Albert Steadman, deceased. It also 
alleged that more than seven years had 
passed since such distribution to the guard-
ian, and before its discharge in 1957, during 
all of which times respondents were in ad-
verse possession and paying the taxes as-
sessed thereon. That at no time did the 
guardian bring suit for the possession of 
the property or make any claim to it. 
Basing its decision on the pleadings, files 
and records in this action, the court granted 
respondents' motion for summary judgment 
on the ground that the Statute of Limita-
tions had run against appellants. 
cuted or defense or counterclaim made." 
"78-12-8. Whenever it appears that 
the occupant, or those under whom he 
claims, entered into possession of the 
property under claim of title, exclusive 
of other right, founding such claim upon 
a written instrument as being a convey-
ance of the property in question, or 
upon the decree or judgment of a compe-
tent court, and that there has been a 
continued occupation and possession of 
the property included in such instru-
ment, decree or judgment, or of some 
part of the property under such claim, 
for seven years, the property so included 
is deemed to have been [held] adversely, 
except that when the property so included 
consists of a tract divided into lots, the 
possession of one lot is not deemed a 
possession of any other lot of the same 
tract." 
"78-12-12. In no case shall adverse 
possession be considered established un-
der the provisions of any section of this 
Code, unless it shall be shown that the 
Appellants contend that the court erred 
in not finding that under the provisions of 
Sec. 78-12-21,2 U.C.A.1953, which provides 
that the Statute of Limitations does not 
commence to run for those under the age 
of majority, they were not barred from 
bringing this action because distribution of 
the estate had been made before the right 
of action in the administrator was barred. 
In Robbins v. Duggins,3 this court held 
that distribution of property in an estate 
before the Statute of Limitations had run 
against the administrator wouid preclude 
the running of the Statute against minors 
to whom distribution had been made and 
who had no guardian to protect and pre-
serve their rights. However, the facts in 
this case are that a guardian was appointed 
land has been occupied and claimed for 
the period of seven years continuously, 
and that the party, his predecessors and 
grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land 
according to law." 
2. "78-12-21. If a person entitled to com-
mence an action for the recovery of real 
property or for the recovery of the pos-
session thereof, or to make any entry or 
defense, founded on the title to real prop-
erty or to rents or services out of the 
same, is at the time such title shall first 
descend or accrue, either: (1) Under the 
age of majority; or, (2) Insane; or, 
(o) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or 
in execution upon conviction of a criminal 
offense, for a term less than for life; 
The time during which such disability 
continues is not deemed any portion of 
the time in this article limited for the 
commencement of such actions or the 
making of such entry or defense." 
3. Robbins v. Duggins, 61 Utah 542, 210 P, 
232. 
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for appellants and distribution was made to 
it of appellants' interest in all th4 property 
which descended to them in their father's 
estate. This guardian had possession or the 
right to possession of their property for 
more than the required seven years. In 
Dignan v. Nelson,4 this court held that 
where the Statute of Limitations has run 
against a guardian, the minor heirs are like-
wise barred, just as we have held that 
when, the administrator was barred, the mi-
nor heirs of decedent6 were barred, and 
for the same reasons. 
Affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
HENRIOD, MCDONOUGH, CALLIS-
TER, and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
KEY NUHBf • SYSTIH, 2> 
375 P.2d 463 
Valera AMUNDSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MUTUAL BENEFIT HEALTH AND ACCI-
DENT ASSOCIATION, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 9588. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 5, 1962. 
Action to recover on a health and acci-
dent policy. From an order granting de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
A. H. Ellett, J., the plaintiff appeals. The 
Supreme Court, McDonough, J., held that 
under policy requiring notice and proof of 
loss to be given as soon as "reasonably pos-
sible" proof of loss should have been filed 
within six years after the loss and where it 
was not filed until after a lapse of 32 years 
recovery on the policy was barred. 
Judgment affirmed. 
1. Insurance <S=>539(I) 
Under a health and accident policy re-
quiring notice and proof of loss as soon as 
"reasonably possible", a beneficiary's de-
mand based upon ignorance of the policy 
must be made within the reasonable time 
for insurer to investigate the claim and be-
fore its staleness poses a substantial ob-
stacle to ascertaining the facts surrounding 
the occurrence. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Insurance <§=>539(6) 
Under a health and accident policy re-
quiring notice and proof of loss to be given 
as soon as "reasonably possible" and the 
statute barring claims based upon written 
contracts after six years has elapsed, proof 
of loss should have been filed within six 
years after the loss, and where it was not 
filed until after a lapse of 32 years recovery 
4. Dignan et al. v. Nelson et JBLI., 26 Utah 5. Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 Utah 108, 66 P. 
186, 72 P. 936. 773. 
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